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ABSTRACT

The goal of the current project was to create a measurement tool that
could be used to assess all aspects of risk perception with one measure. There is
a wide variety of risk-perception measures currently available; however, the
vast majority of these measures assess a very specific risky activity, and many
only assess a person’s perception of the possible negative consequences from
the risk.
There are notable exceptions, such as measures that assess risk in
various domains (e.g., DOSPERT scale; Weber et al., 2002) and assess
perception of possible benefits (e.g., Fromme et al., 1997). There has also been
research into the various dimensions or facets of risk perception, such as
whether a person believes that they have more control in one activity over
another (e.g., Benthin et al., 1993; Fischhoff et al.,1978; Hampson et al., 2001).
Grounded in Balance Theory (Janis & Mann, 1977), the current project utilized
knowledge from these previous studies to create the Holistic Assessment of
Risk Perception (HARP Scale) that assesses possible negative consequences,
possible positive benefits, and the various facets of risk perception across risk
domains.
This project involved a series of studies that collectively used thematic
analyses of interview data to identify the various facets involved in risk
perception (e.g., controllability of situation, past experience) while ensuring that
the identified facets were not conflated with cognitive biases or risk-taking
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behaviour, and then used the identified facets to create a scale and perform a
psychometric evaluation to determine the reliability and validity of the new
scale. Specifically, Study 1 was performed in two parts. Study 1-A assessed the
extent of possible confounds using participant scores on various measures, such
as measures of cognitive bias and risk propensity. The participants from Study
1-A were then used as the sampling frame for Study 1-B, which recruited
participants in order to form four groups that were relatively equal in gender
and other possible confounds. Participants in these four groups were then
interviewed for the purpose of identifying risk-perception facets (e.g.,
controllability of the situation) that were common across the four groups. In
Study 2 the scale items were refined, and an unsuccessful attempt was made to
use quantitative data to verify the weighting of the facets that had been
identified in Study 1-B. The final scale was brought forward for psychometric
evaluation in Study 3, which provided evidence in support of the convergent
validity, discriminant validity, concurrent validity, and internal reliability of the
new HARP Scale.
In sum, the current project has provided a relatively parsimonious
measurement tool that enables research into various risk domains,
acknowledges both potential consequences and benefits, assesses facets that
contribute to risk perception, and does not conflate cognitive bias or risk-taking
behaviour with risk perception. The resulting HARP Scale is able to assess
whether people perceive an activity as a good risk, or a bad risk.
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CHAPTER 1
Good Risk or Bad Risk: Development of a Holistic Assessment of Risk Perception
Risk is ubiquitous in life. For example, Pietrasik (2020) reported an annual rate of
approximately 1.35 million global deaths from road traffic crashes. Yet, a large
proportion of people still choose to travel in motor vehicles daily. A person who invests
their personal savings in a business venture runs the risk of losing their financial security,
and yet business investments are made daily (Zaleskiewicz et al., 2020). A young person
entering post-secondary education risks reducing their opportunity for immediate
financial gain through active employment, yet there were over 2.1 million students
enrolled in Canadian post-secondary institutions during the 2017/2018 academic year
(Statistics Canada, 2020).
In addition to the possible negative consequences, risky situations offer a
possibility for positive benefits. For example, motor vehicle transportation offers the
possibility of getting a person to a preferred location, investing in a business venture
offers the possibility of financial gain (Zaleskiewicz et al., 2020), and post-secondary
education offers the possibility of securing a preferred occupation in the future (Côté et
al., 2008). Therefore, each day people face multiple situations that involve an element of
risk that could be perceived as a good risk or a bad risk, and the same situation may be
perceived as a good risk by one individual, and a bad risk by another individual, due to
the personal nature of risk perception (Fleming & Slank, 2015).
In our society, some risky activities are discouraged, such as the use of illicit
drugs. At the same time, some risky activities are encouraged, such as pursuing
challenging goals (Cooke et al.,2020). A holistic conceptualization of risk perception
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could provide a better understanding of why some people make choices that differ from
the general society’s judgment of the activity as a good risk or a bad risk. This knowledge
could be used to improve current interventions for bad risks, or to improve promotional
efforts for good risks. However, empirical research requires the use of measurements that
will elicit the appropriate information that is required to answer specific research
questions. The current project involves the development of a scale that will facilitate
research in the area of risk perception.
When making a decision that involves risk, a person’s choice can result in lifechanging benefits or life-changing consequences. Utility theory states that rational
decision-makers should always choose the option that provides the maximum expected
utility; wherein, the term “utility” refers to a measure of how attractive the outcome is to
the decision maker (Bernoulli, 1738/1954; Fishburn, 1970; Quiggin, 1982). Utility theory
was the dominant theory guiding research on risky decision making. Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) proposed prospect theory as an alternative to utility theory, by suggesting
that value is found in the changes in wealth or welfare, rather than final states. In other
words, prospect theory suggested that risky decision making is not merely a mathematical
calculation of possible gains versus possible losses; a person’s current situation is an
important consideration when he or she is making a risky decision.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) found that prospect theory better accounted for
risky decision making that was inconsistent with utility theory, such as the certainty
effect, the reflection effect, and the isolation effect. The certainty effect refers to decision
makers’ propensity to underweight outcomes that are merely probable in comparison
with outcomes that are obtained with certainty, which leads to risk-seeking in decisions
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that involve sure losses, and risk-aversion in decisions that involve sure gains. The
reflection effect is similar to the certainty effect, but refers to the tendency to seek risk or
avoid risk, depending on whether the choices are framed as possible losses or gains,
respectively. The isolation effect refers to a situation where the decision maker is
choosing between two or more risky options. It is the tendency to ignore information that
is common to all choices, and only focus on information that is different (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979).
Earlier work by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) had discussed the influence of
heuristics on risky decision making. The three heuristics discussed in their report
included availability, representativeness, and adjustment/anchoring. Availability is a
heuristic in which people judge the probability of an event by the ease with which they
bring the event to mind. For example, air travel may be judged as riskier than it actually
is, because people’s memories of plane crashes are easily brought to mind due to the
catastrophic nature of these incidents. Representativeness is a heuristic in which people
evaluate probabilities by the degree to which a specific event is prototypical of a known
feature or process, while simultaneously ignoring base rate information. For example, if a
scenario is provided in which Man X is described as very tall, with excellent hand-eye
coordination, someone may guess that there is a high probability that Man X is a
professional basketball player, ignoring the fact that professional basketball players
account for a very small proportion of the population. Adjustment and anchoring is a
heuristic in which people make estimates by starting from an initial value (anchor) that is
adjusted to yield the final answer. The adjustment value is usually insufficient, as the
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person tends to keep the adjustment fairly close to the initial value, or anchor (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974).
This past work on heuristics (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), and prospect theory
(Kahneman &Tversky, 1979) sparked a surge of research on heuristics and cognitive
biases that can influence decisions involving risk. During a comprehensive review of the
literature, Craig (2016) found that a large proportion (49%) of that research investigated
the relationship between cognitive biases and gambling behaviours (e.g.,
Ariyabuddhiphongs & Phengphol, 2008; Ball, 2012). However, cognitive biases have not
only been implicated in gambling, but also in many other risky activities (e.g., Bränström
et al., 2006; Busenitz, 1999; Glaser & Weber, 2007). Many risk-taking behaviours can
result in serious consequences, such as possible health problems from smoking
behaviours, or the loss of money, belongings, and even social connections from problem
gambling. For this reason, it is important that we understand the relationship between
cognitive biases, risk perception, and risk behaviour. Risk perception is distinct from
risk-taking behaviour or risk propensity. Risk perception is defined as an individual’s
subjective assessment of the level of risk associated with a particular hazard (American
Psychological Association, n.d.), rather than an objective or observable behaviour.
Cognitive Biases
The influence of cognitive biases on risk-taking behaviour has been investigated
in many academic disciplines and occupational sectors, including business, economics,
psychology, communications, computer science, emergency preparedness, and
medical/health research (e.g., Gilovich, 1983; Robinson & Marino, 2015; Salmon et al.,
2003; Strecher et al., 1995). Therefore, there is a variety of terminology used to describe
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similar phenomena. For example, one phenomenon (representativeness) was defined as a
heuristic by Busenitz (1999) and a bias by Golin (2001). Similarly, another phenomenon
(the ratio-bias effect) was referred to as a heuristic by Denes-Raj and Epstein (1994), and
a bias by Pacini and Epstein (1999). The choice of terminology varies between
disciplines and between authors. The term cognitive bias will be used throughout this
dissertation to describe these phenomena. The following is a brief description of some
cognitive biases that have been described in past literature. This is not a comprehensive
list of all cognitive biases, but rather an overview of some of the biases that are relevant
to the current project, as well as those biases that have commonly been studied in relation
to risk-taking behaviour.
Illusory Pattern Detection
Illusory pattern detection is the general term used to describe a cognitive bias in
which a person has a tendency to assume that a streak will either continue or reverse in
events such as flipping a coin, scoring goals in a sports event, or playing roulette (Wilke
et al., 2014). Other terms that have been used to describe similar variations of this bias
include negative recency, positive recency, gambler’s fallacy, hot hand, and the
clustering illusion (e.g., Barron & Leider, 2010; Wilke et al., 2014). While gambler’s
fallacy and the hot hand effect were originally included under the umbrella term
“representativeness” by Tversky and Kahneman (1974), later work (e.g., Ayton &
Fischer, 2004; Barron & Leider, 2010; Clotfelter & Cook, 1993) related the gambler’s
fallacy and hot hand effect to negative and positive recency, which highlighted their
relationship to illusory pattern detection.
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Illusory pattern detection has been the cognitive bias under study in a large
proportion (27%) of past studies that have investigated the relationship between cognitive
bias and risk (Craig, 2016). This cognitive bias has been studied by looking at lottery
play in relation to previous lottery draws (e.g., Clotfelter, & Cook, 1993; Suetens &
Tyran, 2012; Terrell, 1994), and in investment decisions (e.g., Johnson et al., 2005). It
has also been studied by observing participants’ predictions during games of chance, such
as flipping a coin and roulette (e.g., Ayton & Fischer, 2004; Ball, 2012; Huber et al.,
2010).
Representativeness
Representativeness is a term that generally refers to a bias that influences a
person’s tendency to focus on information that is closer to a prototypical exemplar
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). This bias can influence judgements that involve risk, such
as when people assume that a small sample would yield the same statistical properties as
a large sample. For example, a person may believe that a risky decision with 50%
probability (e.g., flipping a coin) would produce five of each outcome during an activity
with ten trials. However, an outcome of exactly 50% for each outcome would only be
expected with a much larger number of trials. Other terms used to describe similar
phenomena include ratio bias, denominator neglect, belief in small numbers, and belief in
large numbers (e.g., Johnson & Kang, 2013; Pacini & Epstein, 1999). Craig (2016) found
that these cognitive biases have been studied in approximately 10% of past studies that
have investigated the relationship between cognitive bias and risk (e.g., Linnet et al.,
2012; Obrecht et al., 2009).
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Illusion of Control
Illusion of control is a bias that refers to a tendency some people have to
overestimate their ability to control events, and more specifically, an overestimation of
their ability to control the outcome of events (Langer, 1975). For example, a person may
feel that they can influence the outcome of a slot machine by keeping their hand on the
spin mechanism after pulling it; wherein, they believe that the weight of their hand on the
mechanism will make the machine spin faster. Illusion of control has been the cognitive
bias under study in a large proportion (23%) of past studies that have investigated the
relationship between cognitive bias and risk (Craig, 2016). Many of these studies have
used a think-aloud method to investigate this cognitive bias (e.g., Coventry & Norman,
1998; Griffiths, 1994; Ladouceur et al., 1995). During these studies, the researchers
would have participants vocalize all of their thoughts while taking part in an activity
wherein they had minimal control. This cognitive bias can also be measured on a selfreport measure (Steenbergh et al., 2002a), which increases the breadth of methodological
options that can be used in studies of illusion of control.
Illusion of control has been chosen as one of the cognitive biases under study in
the current project. This choice was made based on the ability of this bias to be measured
on a self-report scale, as well as the finding that controllability has been identified in past
literature as an important facet of risk perception (e.g., Benthin et al., 1993a; Hampson et
al., 2001a; Slovic et al., 1979).
Unrealistic Optimism
Unrealistic optimism, or optimism bias are general terms used to describe a bias
in which a person believes that they are likely to receive proportionately more positive
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outcomes than others (Weinstein, 1980). The relationship between unrealistic optimism
and risk perception is unique as compared to other cognitive biases. Unrealistic optimism
is measured as the difference between subjective risk perception and objective risk, or the
odds of a negative consequence actually occurring (e.g., Bränström et al., 2006;
Weinstein, 1987). Therefore, there is an inherent relationship between risk perception and
the measure of unrealistic optimism, because researchers use a participant’s measure of
risk perception to define whether or not they have the cognitive bias. For this reason,
unrealistic optimism cannot contribute to studies that investigate the relationship between
cognitive biases and risk perception.
Positive Thought-Action Fusion
Positive thought-action fusion is a cognitive bias that has only recently been
identified in the literature (Craig & Lafreniere, 2016). Positive thought-action fusion is a
cognitive bias in which a person believes that his or her personal thoughts can influence
real-life events. For example, if a person has a random thought about winning money, he
or she may believe that this thought has improved their chance of winning the lottery.
Rachman, (1993) first identified the concept of thought-action fusion (TAF) when
working with people who experienced obsessive thoughts and displayed compulsive
behaviours. These people showed signs of having an exaggerated sense of responsibility,
wherein they ascribed unjustified importance to random, unwanted thoughts. Rachman’s
work focused on random negative thoughts, while Craig and Lafreniere’s work focused
on random positive thoughts. However, both of these concepts refer to a person’s belief
that their personal, random thoughts can influence external events in the environment.
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Craig (2014) investigated the relationship of positive thought-action fusion to
risk-taking behaviour and risk perception. The results supported a relationship between
positive thought-action fusion and some forms of risk-taking behaviour, but there were
no significant relations between this cognitive bias and risk perception. A limitation of
this study was that risk perception was measured based only on how risky the participants
believed the activities to be, using a five-point rating scale that ranged from “not at all
risky” to “extremely risky”; however, past research (e.g., Sargeant et al., 2010; Slovic et
al., 1979; Weinstein, 1982) has shown that personal and contextual factors are also
involved in risk perception.
Relationships with Risk Perception
During a comprehensive review of the literature, Craig (2016) found very little
consensus regarding the interrelationships between cognitive biases, risk perception, and
risk-taking behaviours. The review included 191 studies that had investigated a
relationship between cognitive biases and either risk behaviour or risk perception. After
removing studies that only used risk perception in order to help define a cognitive bias
(e.g., unrealistic optimism), Craig found that 77 of the remaining studies examined the
relationship between cognitive bias and risk-taking behaviours, while 14 studies
examined the relationship between cognitive bias and risk perceptions. Only five of the
studies examined the relationship between all three variables (cognitive bias, risky
behaviour, and risk perception); however, none of the five studies attempted to model the
directionality of all possible interrelationships between these variables. One possible
barrier to successful modelling of these relationships may be the need for a quantitative
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measure of risk perception that is sensitive to the personal and contextual factors that can
influence risk perception.
Fischhoff, and colleagues (1978) performed a study to investigate attitudes
towards technological risks. During this study, the authors had participants evaluate 30
activities or technologies (e.g., food colouring, commercial aviation, nuclear power) in
relation to the perceived benefit to society, the perceived risk, and the acceptability of its
current level of risk. In addition, Fischhoff and his colleagues had participants evaluate
the technologies on each of nine dimensions that had a predicted influence on risk
perception. The nine dimensions were used to describe participants’ attitudes towards the
various technological risks. For example, food colouring was perceived to have effects
that were not known to be fatal, but at the same time, it was rated as involuntary and
uncontrollable, with delayed effects that were not well known to science or the people
being exposed.
The study by Fischhoff and his colleagues (1978) was intended to provide policy
makers with information about how people perceive the risks that accompany
technological enterprises in society. In the process, the authors discovered that the nine
risk dimensions that they studied proved to be effective predictors of the trade-offs
participants made to choose between acceptable risk and perceived benefit. These risk
dimensions, otherwise known as facets of risk perception, have been used in the creation
of scales used to measure risk perception or risk attitude (e.g., Benthin, et al., 1993b;
Hampson et al., 2001b). The current project posits that the influence of these risk
dimensions on participants’ risky decision making may share theoretical similarities with
decisional balance theory.
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Decisional Balance Theory
Decisional balance is a theory of behavioural change (Janis & Mann, 1977). In
this theory, a person is only motivated to change their behaviour if the negative
consequences from the current behaviour outweigh the benefits gained from that
behaviour, and the benefits of a new behaviour outweigh the negative consequences of
that behaviour. For example, if a person was considering decreasing their alcohol
consumption, they would be motivated to change if their current alcohol consumption
levels carried more negative consequences than benefits, and a reduction in their
consumption would carry more benefits than consequences. Decisional balance measures
have been used in interventions (e.g., Carey et al., 2006; Collins et al., 2009) wherein
participants are asked to fill out an open-ended response measure with four fields (pros of
current behaviour; cons of current behaviour; pros of new behaviour; cons of new
behaviour), with the intended purpose of making the conflict between behaviours and
goals more salient for individuals. In this way, these measures are used as a method for
representing the benefits and negative consequences of different choices, with the hope
that participants will acknowledge the problems associated with the behaviour, and
become motivated to change their behaviour.
Prochaska and several of his colleagues (1994) performed research that supported
the understanding that decisional balance can also be used as an indicator for
participants’ readiness to initiate a specific stage of change. Stages of change are defined
in the Transtheoretical model as stages that individuals move through during behaviour
change (Prochaska & DiClemente, 1982). The stages were first identified as
contemplation, determination, action, maintenance and relapse (Prochaska &
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DiClemente, 1982); however, at the time of the study by Prochaska and his colleagues
(1994), the stages were identified as precontemplation, contemplation, preparation,
action, and maintenance. When Prochaska and his colleagues applied Decisional Balance
Theory to the Transtheoretical Model, they investigated the stages of change as a function
of changes in decisional balance. The authors found a clear pattern of changes in
decisional balance across participants’ stages of change. Therefore, Decisional Balance
Theory explains how individuals weigh the pros and cons of behaviours, and this can
motivate a change in their current behaviour (Prochaska et al., 1994).
Decisional Balance for Risk Perception
Every day, the vast majority of people engage in risky behaviours. For example,
over 3 million global deaths each year are attributable to harmful use of alcohol (World
Health Organization, 2018); yet, alcohol consumption is still a common activity in most
societies. The propensity for people to engage in risky activities is not necessarily a bad
thing. Many risks are beneficial to both the person taking the risk and to society as a
whole. For example, there is an innate risk to any individual who participates in human
drug trials; however, the drug being tested may provide the individual with substantial
health benefits, and the information gained from the drug trials may benefit the health of
others in society. In fact, risk taking is encouraged and nurtured in some situations such
as youth education, as it has been linked to creativity and self-esteem (e.g., Cooke et
al.,2020; Neihart, 1999; Young, 1991).
The choice to label an activity or behaviour as a good risk or a bad risk is a
personal decision that can vary greatly between individuals. The concept of risk
inherently has two components: possible benefits and possible consequences. Whether or
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not an individual chooses to engage in the risky activity is a decision that is largely based
on personal and situational factors (e.g., Sargeant et al., 2010; Slovic et al, 1979;
Weinstein, 1982), which may be conceived as facets of risk perception. A measure of risk
perception that incorporated these risk-perception facets would provide a more holistic
assessment of risk perception. Similar to the influence of decisional balance on behaviour
change, the current project posits that these facets of risk are weighed by individuals
when they are deciding whether a risk is a good risk or a bad risk, which may contribute
to their decision to engage in the risky behaviour.
A limitation of the study by Fischhoff and his colleagues (1978) is that the study
investigated nine possible facets of risk perception that had been derived from past
literature (e.g., Otway, 1975). However, the authors did not empirically explore the
possibility that there may be more risk dimensions than those that were under study.
During a pilot study for the current project (Appendix A), participants were provided an
opportunity to write open-ended responses to questions of risk perception. Several themes
emerged from the data that could be considered facets of risk perception, such as
enjoying thrill-seeking activities and a fear of sanctions. Nonetheless, there were several
limitations to the pilot study, including using an online survey for the collection of
exploratory qualitative data, the order of survey presentation, and limited space for
participants’ open-ended responses.
Using an online method of data collection to gather qualitative information
proved to be a limitation for the pilot study. The qualitative data being sought were
exploratory in nature. This information would have benefitted from face-to-face
interaction between the researcher and each participant to facilitate the use of prompts
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and follow-up questions, in order to elicit the information required for an exploratory
research project. There were also order effects observed in the results from the pilot
study; wherein, the cognitive bias that was measured early in the study (positive thoughtaction fusion) appeared to bias some of the participants’ responses to the open-ended
questions about risk perception. Specifically, some of the participants expressed their
beliefs about whether or not they had a cognitive bias, rather than reporting their
perception of the risk under study. Another limitation of the pilot study was the limited
space that had been provided to participants for their open-ended responses regarding risk
perception. Past research (e.g., Sargeant et al., 2010; Slovic et al., 1979; Weinstein, 1982)
has provided evidence to support the concept of risk perception as a multifaceted
construct. Participants would require a larger space (or a long period of time) to be able
to fully explore the many facets of their risk perception.
To address the limitations of the pilot study, it was decided that collection of
exploratory data on risk perception would benefit from the use of hour-long, face-to-face
interviews. These interviews should be administered solely on the topic of risk
perception, and independent from any other measures to yield a richer data set that could
be used to explore the factors that may contribute to risk perception.
Existing Measures of Risk Perception / Attitude
Existing measures often use the term “risk perception” to refer to a participant’s
perception of the possible negative consequences that can result from a given activity.
However, some of the measures described below acknowledge that people perceive more
than just the possibility of negative consequences. Some of these scales (e.g., DOSPERT
Scale; CARE Scale) include the perception of possible benefits as well as the perceived
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consequences. Other scales (e.g., Benthin Risk Perception Measure; Hampson Risk
Perception Scales) look at a variety of facets that are involved in risk perception.
However, none of the existing scales contain all of the necessary features to provide a
holistic view of risk perception, in a scale that can be used with a variety of research
designs.
Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (DOSPERT) Scale
Created by Weber, Blais and Betz (2002), this 40-item scale assesses a variety of
risk-taking activities in six domains: ethical, investment, gambling, health/safety,
recreational, and social. Three different participant instructions are included in the scale,
which allows the DOSPERT scale to assess risk perception, expected benefits, and
expected engagement in each of the risk-taking activities. While developed mainly to be
used to assess negative risk perception, risk attitude can also be assessed by regressing
the risk perception scores and expected benefit scores on the expected engagement
scores.
Each of the three scales (risk perception, expected benefits, and expected
engagement) contain the same 40 items, which describe various risky activities, such as
“betting a day’s income at the horse races,” or “engaging in unprotected sex.” The only
differences between the three scales are in the instructions and the response choices. To
measure risk perception, Weber, and her colleagues provided the following instructions
to participants:
People often see some risk in situations that contain uncertainty about what the
outcome or consequences will be and for which there is the possibility of ‘bad’
consequences. However, riskiness is a very personal and intuitive notion, and we
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are interested in your gut level assessment of how risky each situation is. For each
of the following statements, please indicate how risky you perceive each situation.
(p. 289).
Item response scales for this risk perception scale range from “not at all risky” to
“extremely risky” on a five-point scale. As can be seen from the instructions, this risk
perception scale measures the participants’ perceptions of the possible negative
consequences that may come from the risky activity.
Weber and her colleagues (2002) used a separate scale, expected benefits, to
assess the participants’ perceptions of the possible benefits that may come from the risky
activity. To measure expected benefits, the instructions are provided to participants are
“For each of the following statements, please indicate the benefits you would obtain from
each situation.” Item response scales for this expected benefits scale range from “no
benefits at all” to “great benefits” on a five-point scale.
The expected engagement scale provides participants with the instructions “For
each of the following statements, please indicate your likelihood of engaging in each
activity or behavior.” Item response scales for this expected engagement scale range from
“very unlikely to “very likely” on a five-point scale (Weber et al., 2002).
The advantages of the DOSPERT Scale are twofold. The scale’s primary benefit
is that it divides risk into various domains (e.g., gambling, social), as past research (e.g.,
Schoemaker, 1990) has shown that people do not perceive all risky situations equally.
Secondly, it acknowledges that people perceive the possible benefits associated with
risky activities in addition to the possible negative consequences; thereby allowing
researchers to measure risk attitude. However, this scale also has some disadvantages.
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Firstly, the measure has 40 items for each of the risk perception, expected benefits, and
expected engagement scales. All three scales must be given to participants in order to
determine the participant’s risk attitude. This process may produce fatigue in the
participant due to the total number of items (n = 120), and the repetition of the same 40
items with three different instructions. Another disadvantage is that the DOSPERT Scale
does not assess the meaning of participants’ assessments of possible consequences versus
possible benefits. For example, do the participants believe certain risky activities to be
more controllable than others? A third disadvantage is that calculation of a risk attitude
score involves the participants’ expectation of engaging in the risk-taking behaviours.
Therefore, risk attitude is not synonymous with risk perception.
Cognitive Appraisal of Risky Events Scale
Created by Fromme, Katz, and Rivet (1997), the Cognitive Appraisal of Risky
Events Scale (CARE) is a 30-item measure that assesses both perceived risk and expected
involvement in risky behaviours. Fromme and her colleagues were able to demonstrate
construct, content, and criterion validity following development of the scale. Participants
record their responses on a seven-point scale that ranges from “not at all likely” to
“extremely likely.” Fromme and her colleagues included an expected risk subscale and an
expected benefits subscale, acknowledging the fact that a risky activity is something that
could result in either a positive or negative consequence. However, the authors did not
attempt to provide a scoring procedure that would combine the perceived consequences
and perceived benefits scores. In addition to the Expected Risk Subscale and the
Expected Benefit Subscale, Fromme and her colleagues included an Expected
Involvement Subscale to measure risk-taking behaviour. The authors found that
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participants’ scores on the expected benefits subscale were positively and reliably
associated with their involvement in risky activities. Each of these three scales is
subdivided into risk domains (illicit drug use; aggressive and illegal behaviours; risky
sexual activities; heavy drinking; high risk sports; academic/work behaviours), resulting
in six Expected Risk subscales, six Expected Benefit subscales, and six Expected
Involvement subscales.
The advantages and disadvantages of the CARE Scale are similar to those of the
DOSPERT Scale, with three main differences. The first difference is that the CARE
Scale uses the same response scales (“not at all likely” to “extremely likely”) for all three
subscales; whereas, the DOSPERT Scale uses different response scales for each of the
subscales. The second difference is that the CARE Scale contains 30 items in each of the
three subscales, for a total of 90 items requiring a response. This is compared to 40 items
on each subscale, or 120 total items, for the DOSPERT Scale. The third, and most
noteworthy difference is that Fromme and her colleagues conceptualized expected
consequences and expected benefits as separate constructs, rather than envisioning their
combined role in risk perception.
TRIRISK Scale
Ferrer, Klein, Persoskie, Avishai-Yitshak, and Sheeran (2016) developed the
Tripartite Model of Risk Perception (TRIRISK) based on a scale that they developed to
measure people’s risk perception of disease. The TRIRISK Scale contains a total of 18
items, with six items in each of the three subscales to measure risk perception:
Deliberative, Affective, and Experiential. The Deliberative Subscale contained items such
as, “When I think carefully about my lifestyle, it does seem possible that I could get
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[disease],” and “On a scale from 0 to 100 %, how would you rate the probability that you
will develop cancer in the future?” (p. 657). The Affective Subscale contained items such
as, “How fearful are you about developing [disease] in the future?”, and “When you think
about [disease] for a moment, to what extent do you feel anxious?” (p. 657). The
Experiential Subscale included items such as, “I feel very vulnerable to [disease],” and
“How easy is it for you to imagine yourself developing [disease] in the future?” (p. 657).
The TRIRISK Scale (Ferrer et al., 2016) provides a richer assessment of how
people perceive their risk of getting a disease. Some of the items appear to assess the
same facets of risk perception that were identified in the research by Fischhoff and his
colleagues (1978). For example, Ferrer and her colleagues included the item “The way I
look after my health means that my odds of getting [disease] in the future are: _____,”
which appears to assess the risk-perception facet of “controllability” that had been
identified by Fischoff and his colleagues. However, there are a limited number of riskperception facets assessed by the TRIRISK Scale. In addition, the TRIRISK Scale is very
specific to the perceived risk of getting a disease, such as cancer. This restricts its use for
research that involves other forms of risk.
Benthin Risk Perception Measure
This scale was developed by Benthin, Slovic, and Severson (1993b) to assess
various factors involved in risk perception, such as controllability of the risk, possible
benefits, and peers’ participation in the risky activity. The scale was designed specifically
for use with adolescents. When using this measure, researchers ask participants to rate
fourteen distinct features of risk perception for each of a variety of risky behaviours. In
the study by Benthin and her colleagues (1993a), participants used a 7-point rating scale
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to rate 30 risky activities (e.g., smoking marijuana, taking diet pills, riding motorcycles)
on fourteen dimensions, such as “to what extent are you influenced by your friends to do
this activity,” and “to what extent are the potential risks (dangers) associated with this
activity frightening for people your age,” (p. 158). In total, participants in the study were
asked to make 420 ratings for the measures of risk perception.
Benthin and her colleagues (1993a) performed a factor analysis of the fourteen
risk dimensions, resulting in two factors that the authors labelled “risk” and “admiration”.
They later plotted the 30 risk-taking activities into one of four quadrants (High Risk –
High Admiration; High Risk – Low Admiration; Low Risk – High Admiration; Low Risk
– Low Admiration), based on the mean participant ratings. Therefore, this scale was
designed to provide an assessment of which activities were considered risky and/or
admirable by adolescents.
While this scale has the potential to provide researchers with a fairly thorough
assessment of participants’ perceptions about risky activities, its size makes it difficult to
use in studies that employ additional scales meant to assess risk perception in relation to
other variables. In addition, this scale does not provide a score for risk perception;
instead, this scale is intended to classify which activities are perceived as riskier than
others.
Another potential weakness of this scale is that the 14 dimensions were not
defined empirically, but rather chosen because of their suspected relevance to adolescent
behaviour. Benthin and her colleagues (1993a) noted that some of the 14 dimensions
came from past research by Slovic and colleagues (1979). The report by Slovic and his
colleagues indicated that they hypothesized their nine dimensions may be relevant to risk-
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taking behaviour. The authors were able to support the relationship between those nine
dimensions and risk perception, but they did not provide empirical evidence to support
the nine dimensions as being sufficient. Benthin and her colleagues chose to include 14
items in their scale, which suggests that they did not believe that the nine items utilized
by Slovic et al. sufficiently represented all of the dimensions that can influence risk
perception. However, similar to the original research (Slovic et al., 1979), Benthin and
her colleagues used a theory-driven approach to produce the 14 dimensions used in the
Benthin Risk Perception Measure. Therefore, it is possible that the scale may be missing
some dimensions that are relevant to risk perception. This can be investigated using
qualitative analyses and a data-driven method to investigate the full scope of dimensions.
Other Risk Perception Measures
Many of the other risk perception measures that have been found in the literature
are specific to one type of risk, such as the Aviation Risk Perception Scale (Hunter, 2002,
2012), the Nuclear Risk Perception and Risk Attributes Measure (Prati & Zani, 2012),
and the Risk Perception Scale for the Consumption of Raw Vegetable Salad in FullService Restaurants (Danelon & Salay, 2012).
There are also risk-perception scales that are very similar to the measures
described previously. For example, the Risk Perception Scales created by Hampson and
colleagues (2001b) are very similar to the Benthin Risk Perception Measure (Benthin et
al., 1993b), and they involve similar limitations for their use. The main difference
between the two measures is that the scales created by Hampson and her colleagues were
designed to specifically measure facets of risk perception related to adolescent alcohol
use. The Hampson Risk Perception Scales utilize 11 scales that each look at one facet of
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risk perception, such as “If someone your age did this activity, to what extent could he or
she control the risks associated with it?” Hampson and her colleagues also included a
twelfth scale to measure the participants’ self-reported frequency of involvement over the
past six months.
The Current Project
In order to assess the interrelationships between cognitive bias, risk perception,
and risk behaviour, an appropriate risk perception scale is needed. The current project
focused on developing a measure of risk perception that provides a holistic measure of
risk perception, by including various facets of risk perception.
It is important that this scale is not confounded with cognitive bias, as its intended
use is to measure the relationships between biases, risk perception, and risk behaviour.
Consequently, care was taken to identify only those facets of risk perception that are
common among participants who are high in cognitive bias and those low in cognitive
bias. Additionally, the scale needs to be sensitive to individual differences in risk-seeking
and risk-avoidance behaviours. Therefore, the identification of risk-perception facets
utilized participants who reported high levels of risk-taking behaviour and those that
reported low levels of risk-taking behaviour. It is also important that this scale is
reasonable in size, in order to facilitate its ease of use in future research (Francis &
Jackson, 2004). There are three main studies included in this dissertation, which aimed to
use both qualitative and quantitative data to produce a reliable, valid, parsimonious scale
that is capable of being used with a wide range of methodologies.

22

CHAPTER 2
Study 1
Facilitated in two parts, Study 1 identified differences in how participants
perceive risk. Rather than investigating whether participants perceive more or less risk in
a given situation, this study was meant to identify differences in the meaning that
participants assign to various risks in order to identify facets of risk perception. For
example, are some risks perceived as more controllable than other risks, making them
seem less risky? Do negative previous experiences with a risky activity mean that the
activity is perceived as being riskier from the participant’s perspective?
Study 1 focused on identifying the facets of risk that collectively result in a
person’s overall risk perception. The research questions that guided Study 1 were:
(1) Are there qualitative differences in risk perception between participants who
are high in cognitive bias and those who are low in cognitive bias?
(2) Are there qualitative differences in risk perception between participants who
frequently engage in risk-taking behaviour and those who do not?
(3) Are there some facets of risk perception that are common to most participants,
regardless of cognitive bias or engagement in risky behaviours?
Methods: Study 1-A
Part A of Study 1 focused on the identification of possible confounds of risk
perception, including people who score high and low in cognitive bias, as well as those
who score high or low in risk-taking behaviours. Positive thought-action fusion and
illusion of control were the two cognitive biases chosen for this study. These two

23

cognitive biases were chosen for both logistical reasons (measures can be used for online
studies) and their plausible relationships with risk perception.
Participants
Participants were recruited through the psychology participant pool at the
University of Windsor. Students recruited through the participant pool received 0.5 bonus
points for up to 30 minutes of participation. The original target sample of 300 participants
resulted in a much lower proportion of males willing to be contacted for Study 1-B
(27.6% of males), than females willing to be contacted for Study 1-B (57.6% of females).
Therefore, the sample size was increased by recruiting additional male participants (n =
100). Following removal of incomplete data, the final sample (n = 384) was fairly diverse
in both age (M = 20.76; range = 17yrs. to 44yrs.) and ethnicity (White/European/
Caucasian = 70.3%, Middle Eastern = 10.2%, South Asian/Indian/Pakistani = 5.2%, East
Asian/Chinese/Japanese = 4.4%, Black/African/Caribbean = 4.2%, Biracial/Multiracial =
3.1%, Latin/South American = 1.3%, Indigenous/First Nations/Metis = 0.5%, Other =
0.8%). There was also a fair representation of both females (n = 241) and males (n =
138). In addition, there were responses from participants who identified as transgender (n
= 2), nonbinary (n = 2), and gender fluid (n = 1).
Measures
The measures in this study were used to gather information regarding
participants’ demographic information, risk-taking behaviour and cognitive biases.
Demographic Questionnaire
This measure was used to collect information about the participants’ gender, age,
ethnicity, and year of study. Additionally, this questionnaire assessed if the participants
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had any extraneous factors that might have influenced their risk-taking behaviours (e.g.,
religious beliefs that prohibit gambling). It also included a question asking participants if
they were willing to be contacted for a follow-up interview (please see Appendix B).
Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (DOSPERT) Scale
This scale was created by Weber and colleagues (2002) to measure a variety of
risk-taking activities in six domains: ethical, investment, gambling, health/safety,
recreational, and social. The DOSPERT scale was created with three subscales. While the
authors used all three subscales together in order to assess risk attitude, each of the three
parts can also be used independently to assess risk behaviour, risk perception, and
expected benefits (e.g., Blais & Weber, 2006; Harrison et al., 2005). The current study
only used the Likelihood of Engaging in Risk subscale to assess risk behaviour. The
DOSPERT Scale contains a total of 40 items, and participants are asked to rate them on a
five-point scale that ranges from “very unlikely” to “very likely.” Please see Appendix C.
During the pilot study for this project, internal reliability for the DOSPERT Likelihood of
Engaging in Risk subscales ranged from questionable (Health & Safety, α = .67) and
acceptable (Social, α = .70; Ethical, α = .76; Gambling, α = .79) to good (Investment, α
=.82; Recreational, α =.83).
Gamblers' Beliefs Questionnaire (GBQ)
The GBQ (Steenbergh et al., 2002b) assesses the gambling-related cognitive
biases of illusion of control and overestimation of the likelihood of winning. It is a 21item self-report measure that uses a Likert-type format for a 7-point scale ranging from
“(1) strongly disagree” through “(4) neutral” to “(7) strongly agree.” The current study
used only the eight items that assess illusion of control as a cognitive bias. Steenbergh
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and colleagues (2002a) found good internal reliability for the Illusion of Control subscale
(α = .84). Please see Appendix D.
Positive Thought-Action Fusion Scale (P -TAF)
Developed by Craig and Lafreniere (2016), this 26-item scale measures the
positive dimension of the thought-action fusion phenomenon on a seven-point scale that
ranges from “(1) strongly disagree” to “(7) strongly agree.” Please see Appendix E. An
exploratory analysis (Craig & Lafreniere, 2016) provided evidence for a five-subscale
structure that included Others (α = .91), Self (α = .84), Financial Gain (α = .86), Moral (α
= .75), and Ethical / Global Concern (α = .76). This subscale structure was confirmed
with a confirmatory factor analysis during the pilot study for this project. In addition, the
pilot study was able to provide additional evidence of a relationship between P-TAF and
risk. Please see Appendix A for further information regarding the pilot study.
Procedures
The results from the pilot study indicated that the P-TAF Scale might have
influenced some of the participants’ responses to questions about risk-taking behaviours.
For example, when asked for views about buying scratch tickets, one participant wrote, “I
don't think that thinking positively about winning is going to increase your chances of
winning because it's something outside of your control.” For this reason, the measures of
cognitive bias were presented to participants after they had completed the other measures
in this study.
The study took place online, using the Qualtrics online survey platform. The order
of presentation to the participants was the consent form, followed by the demographic
questionnaire, the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking Scale – Likelihood of Engaging in Risk
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subscale, the Gambler’s Beliefs Questionnaire, and the Positive Thought-Action Fusion
Scale. These measures were followed by a letter of explanation, which described the
study in greater detail than provided in the consent form.
Results: Study 1-A
The original data file (n = 400) was examined for data that was not missing at
random (n = 16). These data were further examined to ensure that there were no patterns
in the missing data that could be an indication of measurement error. All of these cases (n
= 16) were removed from the data file, as the examination revealed that they were
incomplete data, with no more than one portion of the survey (demographics) completed.
The remaining cases (n = 384) were used in data analyses.
The data were further investigated for any significant differences between
participants who agreed to be contacted for a follow-up interview (n = 183), and those
who did not agree to be contacted (n = 201). None of the participants that identified as
non-cisgendered (n = 5) indicated that they were willing to take part in Study 1-B. There
were no significant differences found in positive thought-action fusion or risk-taking
behaviour between the participants willing to be interviewed and those not willing to be
interviewed. A significant difference was found in scores on the Illusion of Control
Subscale (GBQ Scale; Steenbergh et al., 2002b), with participants who were not willing
to be contacted (M = 24.10, SD = 9.45) scoring higher in illusion of control than those
who were willing to be contacted for a follow-up interview (M = 21.34, SD = 9.06),
t(382) = -2.49, p = .013. However, this difference was nonsignificant when both male,
t(136) = -0.22, p = .830, and female, t(239) = -1.49, p = .138, participants were analysed
separately.
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Cronbach’s alpha was used to assess the reliability of all scales. The results
provided evidence of good reliability (α = .84) of the DOSPERT Scale (Weber et al.,
2002) despite some lower reliability scores for some subscales. In assessing the reliability
of cognitive bias measures, the Illusion of Control subscale from the Gambling Beliefs
Questionnaire (Steenbergh et al., 2002b) was found to have good reliability (α = .84), and
the Positive Thought-Action Fusion Scale (Craig & Lafreniere, 2016) was found to have
excellent reliability (α = .94), with acceptable (α ≥ .76) subscale reliability values. Please
see Table 1 for details from all reliability analyses for Study 1-A.

Table 1 Scale and Subscale Reliabilities (Cronbach’s alpha) for all measures (N = 384)

Scale

Number
of Scale
Items

Mean

SD

Alpha

DOSPERT

40

2.42

0.41

.84

Social

8

3.38

0.58

.61

Recreational

8

2.56

0.80

.78

Gambling

4

1.29

0.51

.72

Health & Safety

8

2.53

0.64

.63

Ethical

8

1.72

0.56

.73

Investments

4

2.48

0.93

.82

GBQ; IoC subscale

8

22.97

9.33

.84

P-TAF Scale

26

64.48

23.95

.94

Other

9

21.37

9.84

.90

Self

6

19.87

7.51

.80

Financial Gain

4

8.19

4.22

.80

Moral

3

7.15

3.13

.76

Global/Ethical Concern

4

7.90

3.96

.77
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Frequency distributions were used to identify participants who scored in the
highest or lowest quartiles on measures of risk propensity and cognitive bias. Outliers
were not removed from the data, as their data had been identified as particularly useful
due to the purpose of Study 1-A, which was to identify participants who score extremely
high or low on specific scales. Participants were chosen for the dimension of risk-taking
behaviour with priority given to those participants who scored in the highest or lowest
quartiles of the total DOSPERT Likelihood of Engaging in Risk subscale, with secondary
priority given to those who scored in the highest or lowest quartiles of only select
domains (ethical, investment, gambling, recreational). The DOSPERT domains of social
risks and health risks were not considered for participant selection, due to the low internal
reliability of these subscale domains. Similar procedures were used to identify
participants who scored in the highest and lowest quartiles of cognitive bias, using the
GBQ Illusion of Control Subscale and the P-TAF Scale with its associated subscales.
Methods: Study 1-B
Part B of Study 1 used qualitative methods to explore participants’ perceptions of
risk. Of particular interest were any facets of risk perception that are common among
participants, regardless of whether they had scored high or low in cognitive bias and risktaking behaviour during Study 1-A. In addition to facet identification, Study 1-B was
used to help determine the relative importance of the various facets of risk in the
participants’ overall risk perception.
Participants
Participants whose responses from Study 1-A indicated a willingness to be
contacted, and who had been identified as scoring high or low in risk-taking activities and
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cognitive bias were contacted to schedule a follow-up interview for Study 1-B. Selection
of participants was based on gender and the participants’ scores from Study 1-A with an
attempt to form four groups, with 10 participants (5 females; 5 males) in each group: (1)
high cognitive bias – high risk; (2) high cognitive bias – low risk; (3) low cognitive bias –
high risk; (4) low cognitive bias – low risk. Gender was balanced in each of these groups,
as past research has found gender differences in risk-taking behaviour and risk perception
(e.g., Byrnes et al., 1999; Harris et al., 2006). In addition, an attempt was made to balance
any participants who indicated extraneous factors (e.g., religious beliefs) across the four
groups. The intended purpose of this balancing was to prevent one group from being
confounded by an extraneous variable. For example, if all ten participants in the low risktaking group had identified as being devout followers of the Islamic religion, their
religious beliefs may have been their only reason for scoring low on the measure of
expected involvement in risky activities (e.g., gambling), which would result in a biased
representation of risk-avoidant participants for Study 1-B.
The final sample for this study (N = 36) consisted of four groups: High cognitive
bias – High risk (female n = 5; male n = 4); High cognitive bias – Low risk (female n = 5;
male n = 3); Low cognitive bias – High risk (female n = 5; male n = 5); Low cognitive
bias – Low risk (female n = 5; male n = 4), with one participant in each of the four groups
indicating that their religious beliefs prevented them from participating in gambling
activities.
The interview sample was sufficiently diverse in regard to both age (M = 21.56,
SD = 4.40, minimum = 18, maximum = 43), and ethnicity (White/European/Caucasian =
61.1%, Black/African/Caribbean = 11.1%, Middle Eastern = 8.3%, Biracial/Multiracial =
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5.6%, South Asian/Indian/Pakistani = 5.6%, East Asian/Chinese/Japanese = 2.8%,
Latin/South American = 2.8%, Other = 2.8%). The participants were compensated with
$15.00 for up to one hour of participation in the interviews.
Materials
An unstructured interview guide was used for this study. The interviews included
items for participants, such as “Can you please describe how you feel about the prospect
of going skydiving?” A sample of some possible interview questions is provided in
Appendix F, with many of the follow-up items (probes) derived from a review of past
literature regarding risk perception and behaviour (e.g., Sargeant et al., 2010; Slovic et
al., 1979; Weinstein, 1982). Because the interviews were exploratory in nature, they
maintained a flexible administration that allowed the participants to fully express their
perceptions of risk.
Procedure
The interviews took place one-on-one in a quiet room on the University of
Windsor campus. The participants received a consent form (including consent for audio
recording), and were provided an opportunity to discuss the contents of the form with the
experimenter. After the participant consented to participate in the study, the experimenter
began the recording device prior to the interview. Following the interview, the participant
was thanked for their participation, and was provided with the compensation ($15.00).
Interviews were transcribed by a research assistant prior to analysis.
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Results: Study 1-B
Preliminary Analyses
As stated previously, the original recruitment (N = 300) for Study 1-A had
resulted in a much lower proportion of males (n = 27.6%) than females (n = 57.6%)
willing to be contacted for follow-up interviews, which necessitated the recruitment of an
additional 100 males for Study 1-A to provide a sufficient sampling frame for the current
study (interviews). Due to the difficulty in recruitment, preliminary analyses were
conducted to determine if the final interview sample was significantly different from the
general population. The analyses involved comparisons between participants’ scores from
Study 1-A and normative data taken from psychometric evaluations of the relevant
scales.
The authors of the DOSPERT (Weber et al., 2002) scale provided separate means
and standard deviations for males and females. There were no significant differences in
risk-taking scores between the DOSPERT normative data (N = 244, M = 2.73, SD = 0.53)
and the current study’s interview sample (N = 16, M = 2.64, SD = 0.39) for males, t(258)
= 0.67, p = 0.505. There were also no significant differences in risk-taking scores
between the DOSPERT normative data (N = 301, M = 2.49, SD = 0.49) and the current
study’s interview sample (N = 20, M = 2.44, SD = 0.48) for females, t(319) = 0.44, p =
0.658.
Both the P-TAF scale and GBQ scale combined genders when reporting their
normative data. There were no significant differences in positive thought-action fusion
scores between the normative data (N = 262, M = 68.50, SD = 25.84) and the current
study’s interview sample (N = 36, M = 66.25, SD = 28.24), t(296) = 0.48, p = 0.629.
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Similarly, there were no significant differences found in Gamblers’ Beliefs
Questionnaire, Illusion of Control subscale scores between the normative data (N = 403,
M = 24.38, SD = 9.95) and the current study’s interview sample (N = 36, M = 22.03, SD
= 10.43), t(437) = 1.35, p = 0.177.
Identification of Risk-Perception Facets
Interview transcripts were analysed using NVivo software in order to identify
emergent themes. Many of the themes that emerged from the data corresponded to
themes from past literature. For example, most participants discussed controllability as an
important facet of their perception of risk involved in a situation. However, there were
differences in what aspects of controllability were identified as being important, such as
having control of whether positive or negative outcomes result from the activity versus
having control of consequence severity. For this reason, there were also several
subthemes that emerged from the data.
Analyses initially identified 24 main themes and an additional 26 subthemes
(Table 2). Saturation was reached at 7 transcripts, with no new themes emerging after that
point. A subsample of two participants from each group (N = 8) was chosen at random
for reliability analyses. Transcripts from the subsample were analyzed by a second coder,
after which analyses showed an inter-rater reliability rate of 85.5% (Cohen’s Kappa =
.69), reflective of substantial agreement (Landis & Koch, 1977). Inter-rater disagreement
did not appear systematic for specific themes, suggesting random coding error.
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Table 2: Themes (Subthemes) Initially Identified in Study 1B

Theme (Subtheme)
1.
2.
3.
4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Admiration of Activity
Interest
Sensory Appeal
Benefit Type
a. (Adrenaline rush / Excitement)
b. (Monetary Gain)
c. (Social Benefit)
Proportion of Benefits versus Consequences
a. (Severity of Consequences)
b. (Significance of Benefit)
c. (Benefits extend to Others)
Consequence Type
a. (Addiction or Frequency of Risk Taking)
b. (Disappoint Significant Others)
c. (Loss of social ties)
d. (Monetary Loss)
e. (Physical harm or Injury)
f. (Sanctions)
Control of Situation
a. (Control of consequence severity)
b. (Barriers to control)
c. (Predictability)
d. (Skills or Abilities)
Ease of Participation
a. (Time or Effort)
b. (Vulnerable or Unsafe Conditions)
Ethical considerations
a. (Guilty Conscience)
b. (Moral Values)
Habit or Internalized behaviour
Immediacy of Effect
Knowledge about activity
a. (Gain experience or Info)
Luck or Optimism
Necessity
a. (Avoidable)
Participation by Others
Past experience
Probability
Relative to Current Position
a. (Nothing to Lose)
b. (Too much to lose)
Apathy
Religion
Reputation or Role Model
Social Influence or Support
Unexplainable fear / phobia
Who is harmed
a. (Risk to Others)
b. (Risk to Self)
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Themes were compared within and between each of the four groups (Group 1:
high cognitive bias – high risk; Group 2: high cognitive bias – low risk; Group 3: low
cognitive bias – high risk; Group 4: low cognitive bias – low risk). The themes of
particular interest were those that emerged at fairly consistent rates across all four groups;
however, themes that emerged at slightly different rates between high risk and low risk
groups were also considered, because small differences in participants’ risk behaviour is
not thought to be a confound for the study of risk perception.
There were several qualitative differences noted between participants who scored
high on the risk behaviour scale and those who scored low on the same scale from Study
1A. For example, when discussing the activity of driving in an automobile a low-risk
participant made the statement, “I’m like, You don’t understand. I can’t handle this. I will
start crying if I can’t get this seat belt on my body right now!”, while a high-risk
participant made the statement, “I am a better driver now, I don’t think about my safety. I
don’t think about I need to put my seatbelt on."
There were also several qualitative differences noted between participants who
scored high on the cognitive bias scales and those who scored low on the same scales
from Study 1A. For example, when discussing skydiving, a participant who scored high
on illusion of control made the statement, “The risks aren’t overly bad, because I did the
tandem jump. I don’t have a license or anything. There’s not too many fatalities or
injuries so I went for it”, while a participant who scored low on illusion of control made
the statement, “You’re attached to someone who has control over what’s going to happen
to you—whether you fall flat—I think I would panic midair and it would not go well.”
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While there were qualitative differences in how participants perceived many of
the various facets of risk perception, the themes occurred at similar rates across the four
groups. Even though participants from each group endorsed the vast majority of themes
at similar rates, there were distinct differences between facets of risk perception in regard
to the number of participants across all groups who endorsed each theme or subtheme.
For example, some facets were endorsed by nearly all participants (e.g., severity of
consequences, control of situation); whereas, other facets were endorsed by
approximately half of the participants from each group (e.g., ease of participation). There
were also some facets that were only mentioned by a small minority of participants in
each group (e.g., benefits others over self). These variations in participant endorsement of
risk-perception facets were noted as indications of the relative importance of facets of
risk perception. Numerical values were assigned based on the number of participants that
identified that specific risk-perception facet, as well as the emphasis that the participants
expressed for certain facets of risk perception. With regard to emphasis, the original
numerical value that represented the number of participants who identified the risk was
increased by one value if a participant mentioned the same facets of risk perception more
than three times throughout the interview, or if two or more participants specifically
emphasized the importance of a theme. For example, “NO [extended pronunciation]! So
many things can go wrong in that situation. You never really know” was coded as placing
emphasis on the theme (lack of) predictability. If another participant had also indicated
emphasis of that theme, the numerical value would have been increased by one unit. The
final assigned numerical weighting values were retained for analyses in Study 2A.
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Several themes were also identified that did not include any data that was unique
only to that theme. For example, all statements that had been coded into the theme of
Benefit Type, had also been coded into one of the benefit-type subthemes. Similarly, all
statements that had been coded into the theme of Consequence Type, had also been coded
into one of the consequence-type subthemes. The theme Relative to Current Position also
contained all statements that had been coded into the subthemes of Nothing to Lose and
Too Much to Lose, leaving the subthemes with no unique contributions. Therefore,
Benefit Type, Consequence Type, Nothing to Lose, and Too Much to Lose were removed
due to lack of unique contributions, leaving a total of 46 themes for further analyses.
The next iteration of thematic analysis revealed that despite having a small
number of unique contributions, some of the subthemes reflected constructs that were
very closely related to other themes, which may have accounted for the coding errors. For
example, some data from Social Influence or Support included statements that fit very
well, such as “It depends who is around and how much fun I am having. I probably
wouldn’t do it if they weren’t around. It depends on the context.” A second comment that
seemed to reflect this theme well was “It depends. If I am at a party with my friends, it’s
not a big thing. But if I went to a Frat party then there is a big pressure to drink. Everyone
is like Have a drink…loosen up.” A third comment coded as Social Influence or Support
was “Sometimes it’s easier to fit in than to be by yourself. I’d be more tempted because
everyone else is doing it.” While these comments did reflect social influence or support,
they also reflected other themes (e.g., Social Benefit and Participation by Others).
Several other themes were also identified that were closely related to other
themes. For example, there was considerable overlap between “Sensory appeal of risk
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activity” and “Adrenaline rush.” There was also a great deal of overlap between “Ethical
or moral considerations”, “Guilty conscience”, and “Moral values”. In total, 20
(sub)themes were identified as superfluous, leaving 26 themes for further analyses. All
data that had been originally coded into the omitted 20 themes were able to be recoded
into one of the remaining 26 themes. Please see Appendix G for examples of data that
contributed to the 26 themes retained at the end of the current study.
Many of the final 26 themes still exhibited strong relationships to other themes.
For example, comments made during the interviews that referred to the number of
possible benefits as compared to the number of possible consequences were coded into
the theme “Benefits versus Consequences”. There were also two additional themes that
were closely related; specifically, the themes “Significance of Benefit” and “Severity of
Consequence” were closely related to “Benefits versus Consequences”. The decision was
made to retain these themes (and other groups of themes that were similarly related) as
being unique, due to the differences in importance that participants had expressed during
the interviews. Participants clearly expressed that the severity of any possible
consequences was more important in their perception of risk than the significance of any
possible benefits. At the same time, participants considered both the severity of
consequences and significance of benefits as being more important than the number of
benefits as compared to the number of consequences. Therefore, it was considered
important to retain all of these as separate themes, rather than combining them into a
higher order theme.
The next iteration of thematic analysis delineated each theme (facet of risk
perception) into a collection of question items that reflected each meaning. It is important
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to note that risk facets do not represent different factors or subscales. Rather, they
represent the various matters that people consider when evaluating the riskiness of an
activity. Most of the facets reflected constructs that could be represented with a variety of
different questions. For example, the facet Admiration for Risk Activity could be
represented by the question item “It is an admirable activity” or “Most people see it as an
admirable activity” or “I think it is an activity that my friends would admire.” Main
question items were chosen to best represent each specific facet. The number of main
question items chosen reflected the relative importance that participants had expressed
for the facet. For example, Ethical or Moral Considerations was a facet emphasized as
being extremely important in the participants evaluation of a risk; therefore, four main
questions items were chosen to represent Ethical or Moral Considerations. In comparison,
having previous knowledge about the activity was not emphasized as being important, so
only one question item was chosen as a main item for the facet of Knowledge About
Activity. The reason that some facets were assigned more items than other facets
(reflecting their relative importance) was for the purpose of weighting the scale. In this
way, facets that were considered to be more important in risk perception, would receive a
heavier weighting in the final scale than facets that were considered less important.
Despite qualitative analyses suggesting that the main items alone were both
necessary and sufficient to represent their respective facets, the decision was made to
retain additional question items for analyses in the next study. Some of these added items
were identical in meaning to their respective main item, but with alternative phrasing.
These items were retained for analyses in the next study to ensure that if any of the main
items were misinterpreted by participants or caused confusion, there would be alternative
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item options that could be substituted in place of the main item. Additionally, there were
some items retained for the next study that had a slightly nuanced meaning in comparison
to the main item. The main reason for retaining these nuanced items was to assess
whether there were alternative items that would better represent their relative facet than
the items that had been chosen as main items. This decision to retain extra items for
quantitative analyses resulted in a total of 172 items for the next study, which can be
found in Appendix H.
Discussion
The main goal of Studies 1A and 1B were to identify facets of risk perception,
which are variables that contribute to a person’s identification of a risk as being a good
risk or a bad risk. Study 1A assessed participants’ past risk-taking behaviours, as well as
the extent to which they held cognitive biases that were relevant to risk perception. The
specific purpose of Study 1A was to identify potential participants for Study 1B who
scored in the top or bottom quartiles on measures of cognitive bias and risk-taking
behaviour.
Despite some difficulties in recruitment, a sufficient number of eligible
participants agreed to take part in Study 1B, which involved one-on-one interviews. The
participants who agreed to be contacted for a follow-up interview did not differ
significantly on scores for risky behaviour or cognitive biases from participants who did
not agree to be contacted. The final interview sample was also found to accurately reflect
the general population in relation to their scores on measures of risky behaviour and
cognitive biases, when compared to normative data.
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The first research question inquired if there were possible qualitative differences
in risk perception between participants who are high in cognitive bias and those who are
low in cognitive bias. Analyses of the interview data found only minimal qualitative
differences in how the facets of risk perception were perceived by participants who had
scored high in cognitive bias and those who scored low in cognitive bias. For example,
both high-bias and low-bias groups identified controllability as being an important facet
of risk perception; however, participants who had scored high in illusion of control
occasionally expressed that they had more control in some situations, when compared to
participants who had scored low in illusion of control.
Qualitative differences between low-bias and high-bias groups were expected, and
necessary for the scale to be sensitive to differences between groups. On the other hand,
quantitative differences in the facets of risk perception would have been an indication
that that the new risk perception scale would be confounded with cognitive bias.
Consequently, only those facets of risk perception that were common among participants
who scored high in cognitive bias and those low in cognitive bias were of interest for the
new scale. All facets of risk perception that were identified in Study 1 occurred at
relatively similar rates between both high-bias and low-bias groups, providing support for
the construct validity of the risk perception facets identified in this study.
The second research question inquired if there were qualitative differences in risk
perception between participants who frequently engage in risk-taking behaviour and
those who do not. These analyses found that while both high- and low-risk-taking groups
identified the same facets of risk perception, there appeared to be some differences
between high and low risk-taking groups in whether participants appraised facets of risk
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perception as positive or negative. For example, an adrenaline rush was perceived as a
positive experience by most participants in the high-risk group, but as a scary, negative
experience by many participants in the low-risk groups.
The third research question inquired if there were some facets of risk perception
that are common to most participants, regardless of cognitive bias or engagement in risky
behaviours. Thematic analyses found that the vast majority of identified risk-perception
facets were common among participants from all four groups. Nonetheless, there were
distinct differences between facets of risk perception in regard to the number of
participants from each group who endorsed each specific facet. For example, some facets,
such as Past Experience were endorsed by nearly all participants; whereas, other facets,
such as Ease of Participation were endorsed by approximately half of the participants
from each group. There were also some facets that were only mentioned by a small
minority of participants in each group. These differences in participant endorsements may
indicate that there are some facets of risk perception that are not important to all
perceivers of risky situations. Alternatively, the differences may indicate that some facets
of risk perception were simply not salient to the participants at the time of their
interviews.
Many of the risk-perception facets that were identified in the current study were
similar to those identified in past research. For example, the risk-perception facet of
Admiration for Risk Activity identified in the current study was conceptually similar to
the risk-perception facet Admiration from the Benthin Risk Perception Measure (Benthin
et al.,1993), and also similar to the Peer Admiration risk-perception facet from the Scales
created by Hampson and colleagues (2001). Similarly, the risk-perception facet of
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Severity of Consequences identified in the current study was conceptually similar to the
risk-perception facet Seriousness of Effects from the Benthin Risk Perception Measure,
as well as being similar to the Severity of Consequences risk-perception facet reported by
Fischhoff and colleagues (1978). Please see Appendix I for further detail.
There were eight facets of risk perception identified in the current study that
appeared to be conceptually unique to risk-perception facets from past literature, and 18
facets of risk perception that exhibited conceptual similarities with risk-perception facets
from past research. However, as noted previously, some facets of risk perception may not
be considered important by all risk perceivers, and some risk facets just may not be
salient to perceivers for some types of risk. It was hoped that quantitative analysis could
be used in the next study to better facilitate demarcation between the importance and
salience of various risk-perception facets to aid in the facet weighting. Nonetheless, this
study was successful in identifying the 26 unique facets of risk perception, and
determining tentative weighting of their importance based on qualitative data.
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Table 3: Description of Risk-Perception Facets Retained
Risk-Perception
Facet

Weight
Value

Admiration of
Activity

3

Interest

2

Adrenaline rush/
Sensory Appeal

3

Social Benefit

1

Benefits versus
Consequences
Severity of
Consequences

1
3

Significance of
Benefit

2

Disappoint
Significant Others

2

Control of
Situation

2

Predictability

1

Skills or Abilities

3

Ease of
Participation

1

Unsafe
Conditions

1

Ethical or Moral
considerations

4

Immediacy of
Effect

2

Description
The risky activity holds a place of esteem, such as
something that would equate to an act of bravery.
Perceiver values the idea of telling others they
accomplished the activity
The risky activity draws the attention and/or curiosity of
the perceiver
Perceiver anticipates a possible thrill or stimulation that
is entertaining or attractive to the senses
Perceiver anticipates the strengthening of existing social
bonds, or the creation of new social relationships to
result from engaging in the specific risky activity
Perceives an imbalance in the possible benefits and
consequences of the specific risky activity
The possible consequence(s) could be overwhelming or
catastrophic
The benefit is meaningful or significant enough to
influence the decision independent of the possible
consequences
Participation in the risky activity would likely receive
disapproval of family or friends. Perceiver fears not
meeting the expectations of people who are significant in
their life.
Control of the situation or the severity of any possible
consequences
Situation is unpredictable making it difficult to assume
probabilities of success
Perceives having a skill set that maximizes receiving the
benefits from an activity and/or lowers the possibility of
negative consequences. Successfully using that skill set
provides a sense of power or accomplishment.
Activity requires commitment of resources (preparation)
or involves barriers that make participation in the risky
activity more difficult
The risk associated with the activity is intensified by
contextual factors (e.g., environment)
Activity is judged as being right or wrong, rather than
just considered for benefits and consequences, and
participation in the activity has the propensity to create a
guilty conscience for the participant
Perceiver weights benefits or consequences that will be
received in the near future more heavily than those
expected in the distant future
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Risk-Perception
Facet
Knowledge about
activity

Weight
Value
1

Gain experience
or Info

3

Necessity

2

Common

1

Past experience

1

Probability

2

Relative to
Current Position

2

Apathy

1

Religion

1

Fear / phobia

1

Risk to Others

1

Description
Perceiver does not believe they have sufficient
information to participate in the activity
Participation in the activity provides an opportunity to
gain knowledge or experience, or acts as a bridge to
opportunities
Participation in the activity would satisfy a need (e.g.,
hunger, shelter), and the situation or context makes it
unlikely that participation in the risky activity can be
avoided
Perceiver views the activity as something that others
commonly participate in
Past experience (good or bad) in the activity by the
participant or a close acquaintance acts as a deterrent or
instigator to engagement in activity
Likelihood of receiving benefits over consequences.
decision made is similar to a mathematical calculation
Willingness to take the risk is dependent on the
perceiver's current position (financial, occupational, etc.)
Perceives that Risk is unescapable in life, so just go with
it.
Perceives the activity as being against their religion or
their religious values
Perceiver has difficulty even considering the activity due
to an extreme fear or phobia that prevents rational
thought
Participation may lead to consequences for others not
involved in the activity
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CHAPTER 3
STUDY 2
The purpose of Study 2 was to use the results from Study 1 to develop the Holistic
Assessment of Risk Perception (HARP) Scale, by providing quantitative data that could
be used in combination with the qualitative data from Study 1-B to confirm the scoring
procedure (weighting of facets) for the new scale. A second purpose of Study 2 was to
use quantitative data to assess if the main items chosen for the scale (47 items) in Study
1-B, best represented the facets of risk perception.
Due to the wide range of risky activities (e.g., health risks, financial risks, moral
risks), not all facets of risk perception will be applicable to every type of risk. The 172
items that were brought forward from Study 1-B were based on interviews, in which
participants had discussed a very broad range of risky activities. However, due to the
large number of items under study, it was not feasible to include every type of risk in the
current study. Therefore, an attempt was made to choose risky activities for Study 2 that
had potential to elicit a fairly large number of facets of risk perception. The specific risk
activities that were chosen were (1) investing in the stock market, and (2) slightly
cheating on taxes, such as exaggerating expenses. Investing in the stock market was
chosen because it is a socially acceptable form of gambling and was mentioned several
times in interviews as an activity that students were actively engaged in, or were
considering. The risk of slightly cheating on taxes was chosen because it reflects a moral
or legal risk and is therefore less socially acceptable. While some of the participants may
have limited experience with the stock market or taxes, the current study was interested
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in the participants’ perception of the activity as a good risk or a bad risk, which did not
require actual involvement with the activity.
Despite these risks having the potential to elicit a fairly large number of facets of
risk perception, they were utilized with the knowledge that they did not represent all
forms of risk-taking, and therefore it was likely that they would be unable to elicit all
facets involved in risk perception. For example, the facets of risk perception that a person
may consider when thinking about participating in a health risk or an extreme sport
would not necessarily be the same facets of risk perception that they would consider
when thinking about stock markets or tax preparation. Since the interviews performed in
Study 1B had included a much broader range of risk types, the current study was
performed under the predetermination that data analyses would not only need to include
information from the qualitative analyses of interviews performed in Study 1B but would
also need to weight the information from the comprehensive interviews more heavily in
decisions regarding the removal of any items and scoring procedures.
There were no hypotheses associated with Study 2 due to its exploratory nature.
The guiding research questions for this study were: (1) Are the main 47 items developed
in Study 1-B the best question items for use in the new scale? (2) Does quantitative data
from the current study support the weighting of facets that had been determined with
qualitative data in Study 1-B?
Methods
The current study was designed to provide quantitative data that could be used
with the qualitative data from the previous study (Study 1-B) to perform data analyses
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using mixed methods to confirm the relative weighting of the risk-perception facets and
support the use of the main 47 question items for the scale.
Participants
A sample of 100 participants was recruited through the psychology participant
pool. There were no inclusion criteria for this study. Exclusionary criteria included any
persons who participated in Study 1-B. Students recruited through the participant pool
received 1 bonus point for up to 60 minutes of participation. One participant withdrew his
data following the study. Data from an additional 10 participants were removed due to
non-serious reporting. The remaining sample (N = 89) had a large proportion of female
participants (77.5%), and consisted mainly of young adults, with an average age of
approximately 23 years (M = 22.85, SD = 6.66). The ethnicity of the participant sample
was fairly diverse (66.3% White/European/Caucasian; 9% Middle Eastern; 6.7%
Black/African/Caribbean; 5.6% South Asian/Indian/Pakistani; 2.2% Indigenous/ First
Nations/Metis; 2.2% East Asian/Chinese/Japanese; 5.6% Multiple ethnicities; 2.2%
Other).
Measures
Tentative HARP Risk Perception Items
Participants were presented with a list of 172 items (Appendix H) developed from
the 26 themes that had emerged from Study 1B. Participants were asked to indicate the
extent that they agreed with each of the 172 items on a 7-point scale that ranged from (1)
Strongly Disagree to (7) Strongly Agree. The list of risk perception items was presented
twice to all participants. Due to the extensive length of the survey, the following
instructions were provided to participants before beginning the first administration of the
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risk perception items, and again prior to the second administration of the risk perception
items:
Truthful responses are extremely important for accurate scale development. We
are aware that this is a lengthy scale, but please take your time and respond as
accurately as possible. If you need to take a break while completing this survey,
you can exit your browser and when ready, click on the link you were provided
and begin where you left off.
For the first administration of the items, participants were asked to think about the
situation Investing in the stock market, and for the second administration, participants
were asked to think about the situation Slightly cheating on taxes (e.g., exaggerating
expenses).
Demographic Questionnaire
This measure was used to collect information about the participants’ gender, age,
ethnicity, and year of study, for the purpose of describing the sample. Please see
Appendix B.
Added Items to Approximate Risk-Perception
This study utilized ten questions to estimate participants’ overall assessment of
the risky activities being investigated (investing in the stock market and cheating on
taxes). Specifically, for each of the risky activities, participants were asked to respond to
five questions (please see Appendix J). These five questions evaluated the extent that
participants perceived the activity as risky, as well as the expected likelihood of receiving
positive benefits or negative consequences from the activity. Participants were also asked
to indicate whether they believed the activity to be worth the risk, and whether they
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would consider taking part in the activity within the next six months, if they were given
the opportunity to do so. These items were used to produce a para-risk-perception score
(a rough estimate of risk perception) for analyses. The term para-risk-perception items
will be used to refer to these items collectively.
Procedure
The study took place online, using the Qualtrics online survey platform.
Participants were first presented with the consent form. If the participant consented to
participate in the study, they were asked to respond to the tentative HARP risk perception
items, which were presented in randomized order. Next, participants were presented with
the demographic questionnaire, followed by the para-risk-perception items. These
measures were then followed by a letter of information to explain the purpose of the
study in greater detail, and provided an opportunity for participants to withdraw their data
from the study. The placement of the demographic questionnaire between the HARP risk
perception items for the new measure and the para-risk-perception items was intended to
provide a distraction, so that participants’ responses to the HARP risk perception items
were less likely to influence their responses on the para-risk perception items.
Results
The data file was examined for missing data patterns. Participants whose data was
not missing at random, or whose data was identified as non-serious reporting were
removed from the analyses. Non-serious reporting was identified through both short
completion times and response sets. Outliers were not removed, as none were identified
as influential outliers that had a significant impact on the data. Individual question items
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were reverse scored as applicable, in an attempt to have all question items assessing the
extent that participants perceived the activity as a negative or “bad” risk.
Following data cleaning, a score of benefit/consequence balance was computed as
the result of subtracting scores from the item, “Please indicate how likely you would be
to receive benefits if you took part in the following activities” from the item “Please
indicate how likely you would be to receive negative effects if you took part in the
following activities”. Positive benefit/consequence balance scores represented
participants who considered that particular risk as having more expected consequences
than benefits; whereas, negative scores represented participants who considered that
particular risk as having more perceived benefits than consequences. These
benefit/consequence balance scores had a possible range of 12 (-6.0 to 6.0) and were
computed for both the risk activity of investing in the stock market (M = -0.31, Mdn =
0.00, SD = 2.35), as well as for the risk activity of slightly cheating on taxes (M = 3.09,
Mdn = 4.00, SD = 2.69).
Spearman’s correlation coefficients were used for item-level analyses as they are
more appropriate for ordinal level data (Field, 2018). The benefit/consequence balance
scores were negatively correlated with the item “Please indicate the extent to which you,
personally, consider the following activities as being worth the risk” for the activity of
investing in the stock market (rs(88) = -.61, p < .001) and for the activity of slightly
cheating on taxes (rs(88) = -.53, p < .001). The benefit/consequence balance scores were
positively correlated with the item “Please indicate your overall assessment of the
riskiness of each of the following activities” for the activity of investing in the stock
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market (rs(86) = .64, p < .001) and for the activity of slightly cheating on taxes (rs(87) =
.36, p = .001).
A para-risk perception score was created for analyses, by summing the
benefit/consequence balance score with the score from the “overall assessment of
riskiness” item and subtracting the “worth the risk” item score for each of the risky
behaviours. The para-risk-perception scores had a possible range of 24 (-12 to 12),
providing greater variability for analyses. Participants perceived cheating on taxes (M =
7.19, SD = 4.29) to be more of a negative, or “bad” risk than investing in stocks (M = .29, SD = 4.72), t(86) = 11.00, p < .001.

Table 4: Items used in Calculation of Para-Risk-Perception Scores
Question Items
1. Please indicate how likely you would be to receive negative
effects if you took part in the following activities
2. Please indicate how likely you would be to receive benefits

if you took part in the following activities
3. Please indicate your overall assessment of the riskiness of

each of the following activities
4. Please indicate the extent to which you, personally, consider

the following activities as being worth the risk
Note:
Benefit/Consequence Balance Score = Item 1 – Item 2
Para-Risk-Perception Score = (Item 1 – Item 2) + Item 3 – Item 4

The current study was interested in risk perception, not risk-taking behaviour.
However, significant negative correlations were found between the para-risk-perception
scores and the item “If given the opportunity, how likely is it that you would consider
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taking part in the following activities within the next 6 months?” for the activity of
investing in the stock market (rs(86) = - .57, p < .001) and for the activity of slightly
cheating on taxes (rs(86) = - .49, p < .001).
Each of the risk-perception facets that had been identified in Study 1B were
represented by multiple items for the scale that was administered to participants in the
current study. These facets were represented with a minimum of two items, and a
maximum of 14 items (M = 6.62, SD = 3.19; Mdn = 5.50). The mean was computed for
individual question items from each facet to create a score for each facet in the data set.
This computation resulted in two scores for each facet, with one score reflecting the
participants’ responses in relation to investing in the stock market, and the other score
reflecting the participants’ responses in relation to cheating on taxes.
Item Refinement
As noted in Study 1B, main items had been identified that best represented each
of their respective facets, but additional items had been included to ensure that the
phrasing of items captured the facet meaning in its entirety, and that no items were
misinterpreted by participants. Therefore, most facets were represented by very similar
(redundant) items in the current study. Hierarchical regression was used, with the main
items being analyzed in the first block, and the similar (mainly redundant) items being
placed in the second block to assess any relative contribution they made above the main
items. All main items that had been developed in Study 1B made significant quantitative
contributions to their respective facet scores. Therefore, none of the items that were
identical in meaning to the main items were of interest, since replacement of main items
was not required. To ensure that all relevant nuanced meanings of the facets had been
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captured, the results were then analyzed with the goal of identifying any items that (1)
made a significant quantitative contribution to the item’s respective facet score when
used to measure both of the risky activities assessed in the current study, and (2) were
qualitatively (conceptually) different from the original item(s) chosen to represent that
facet.
There were several instances of the added items meeting one criterion listed
above, but not both criteria. Specifically, many of the items that were identical in
meaning did make a significant contribution to the scale, but they did not add value to the
scale because their conceptual meaning was redundant (asking the participant the same
question twice). For example, the facet of “Admiration for activity” when used to
consider the risky activity of investing in the stock market, had one item that made a
significant contribution beyond the main items, “It would be great to be able to tell my
friends about it,” β = .339, t = 2.263, p = .027. However, this item was conceptually
redundant and highly correlated with the main item, “It is one of those experiences that
you can’t wait to tell your friends about,” rs = .57, p < .001. For the same facet of
“Admiration for activity” when used to consider the risky activity of cheating on taxes,
the same item (It would be great to be able to tell my friends about it) made a significant
contribution beyond the main items, β = .325, t = 2.059, p = .043. Again, this item was
conceptually redundant and highly correlated with the main item, “It is one of those
experiences that you can’t wait to tell your friends about,” rs = .69, p < .001.
The results supported the use of the original main items, as none of the additional
items made both a qualitative and significant quantitative contribution to the facet
subscale scores. The retained items (N = 47) represented each of the facets with the
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number of items (minimum of one item, maximum of four items) that had been
determined as appropriate weighting during qualitative analysis in Study 1B. These items
were brought forward into the next set of analyses, which was intended to examine
whether quantitative data could support the decisions that had been made regarding the
relative weighting of the facets.
Weighting of Risk-Perception Facets
Investing in the Stock Market
New facet scores were calculated as the average score of the main question items
for each of the facets that they represented, respectively. Regression analyses were used
to examine the relative contribution of the average risk-perception facet scores to the
para-risk-perception score. Examination of the probability plots (standardized residual vs
standardized predicted) indicated that the assumptions of linearity and homoscedasticity
were not violated. The P-P plot indicated a possible violation of the assumption of
normality of errors, with a slight S-shaped curve that is associated with skew; however,
the histogram confirmed that residual values were only slightly skewed. The DurbinWatson value (Durbin-Watson = 1.737) was within the required range, indicating
independence of errors. Both tolerance and VIF indicated the absence of
multicollinearity and singularity (tolerance ≥ .2; VIF < 10). No outliers were found to be
influential observations (COOKS <1; DFFIT <2); therefore, no observations were
removed prior to analysis. The model was significant, R2 = .71, F(26,56) = 5.24, p < .001,
but the only facets shown to significantly predict para-risk-perception scores were
Severity of Consequences (b = 1.139, p = .032), Significance of Benefit (b = 0.899, p =
.041), and Apathy (b = -0.853, p = .035). Please see Table 5 for item-level details.
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Table 5: Regression Analysis Summary for Facets of Risk Perception (Investing in
Stocks) Predictors of Para-Risk Perception Score
B

SE B

β

t

p

-.316

.642

-.072

.491

.625

Interested

.513

.545

.158

.941

.351

Sensory / Adrenaline

.615

.589

.171

1.043

.301

-.401

.369

-.110

1.087

.282

.078

.517

.018

.150

.881

1.139

.518

.257

2.199

.032

.899

.430

.238

2.090

.041

Disappoint Others

-.423

.362

-.119

1.167

.248

Control of Situation

-.630

.537

-.154

1.173

.246

.049

.342

.014

.144

.886

-.223

.630

-.057

.354

.724

Ease of Participation

.316

.311

.083

1.016

.314

Vulnerable / Unsafe Conditions

.597

.441

.184

1.355

.181

Ethical or Moral Considerations

.212

.633

.049

.336

.738

Immediacy of Effect

.312

.561

.062

.556

.580

Knowledge about Activity

.178

.329

.053

.539

.592

Gain Experience or Information

.912

.620

.217

1.470

.147

-.105

.488

-.019

.214

.831

.370

.303

.113

1.219

.228

Past Experience

-.317

.312

-.096

1.016

.314

Probability

1.146

.660

.271

1.736

.088

Relative to Current Position

-.212

.556

-.049

.382

.704

Apathy

-.853

.394

-.268

2.163

.035

Religion

.026

.355

.009

.072

.943

Fear or Phobia

.465

.336

.169

1.383

.172

Risk to Others

-.017

.311

-.005

.053

.958

Admiration

Social Benefit
Benefit vs Consequences

Severity of Consequences
Significance of Benefit

Unpredictability
Skills or Abilities

Necessity
Participation by Others
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Slightly Cheating on Taxes
New facet scores were calculated as the average score of the main question items
for each of the facets that they represented, respectively. Regression analyses were used
to examine the relative contribution of the average risk-perception facet scores to the
para-risk-perception score. Examination of the probability plots (standardized residual vs
standardized predicted) indicated that the assumptions of linearity and homoscedasticity
were not violated. Similar to the regression analysis for Stocks, the P-P plot indicated a
possible violation of the assumption of normality of errors, with a slight S-shaped curve
that is associated with skew; however, the histogram confirmed that residual values were
only slightly skewed. The Durbin-Watson value (Durbin-Watson = 1.873) was within the
required range, indicating independence of errors. Both tolerance and VIF indicated the
absence of multicollinearity and singularity (tolerance ≥ .2; VIF < 10). No outliers were
found to be influential observations (COOKS <1; DFFIT <2); therefore, no observations
were removed prior to analysis. The model was significant, R2 = .67, F(26,59) = 4.52, p <
.001.
The facets shown to significantly predict para-risk-perception scores were
Sensory/Adrenaline (b = 1.432, p = .050), Significance of Benefit (b = 0.901, p = .030),
Unpredictability (b = 0.628, p = .007), Skills or Abilities (b = 1.370, p = .035), and Fear
or Phobia (b = 1.033, p = .003). Therefore, the only facet that had significantly predicted
para-risk-perception scores for both risky activities was Significance of Benefit. Please
see Table 6 for item-level details for the activity of cheating on taxes.
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Table 6: Regression Analysis Summary for Facets of Risk Perception (Cheating on
Taxes) Predictors of Para-Risk Perception Score
B

SE B

β

t

p

-.659

1.042

-.101

.633

.529

.726

.564

.149

1.286

.203

1.432

.716

.291

2.000

.050

Social Benefit

.520

.668

.096

.779

.439

Benefit vs Consequences

.480

.396

.139

1.214

.230

-.018

.582

-.004

.032

.975

.901

.405

.283

2.226

.030

-.547

.502

-.158

1.089

.280

.153

.366

.042

.418

.678

-.628

.227

-.251

2.773

.007

-1.370

.635

-.320

2.157

.035

-.249

.227

-.101

1.099

.276

Vulnerable / Unsafe Conditions

.621

.440

.178

1.414

.163

Ethical or Moral Considerations

-.273

.705

-.061

.387

.700

Immediacy of Effect

.208

.364

.062

.573

.569

Knowledge about Activity

.123

.347

.038

.353

.725

-.404

.688

-.100

.587

.559

Necessity

.297

.507

.066

.585

.561

Participation by Others

.403

.260

.150

1.554

.126

Past Experience

.067

.199

.029

.337

.737

Probability

.532

.533

.126

.998

.322

Relative to Current Position

.182

.424

.048

.429

.669

Apathy

.232

.536

.053

.432

.667

Religion

-.011

.229

-.005

.049

.961

Fear or Phobia

1.033

.334

.388

3.093

.003

Risk to Others

.117

.324

.046

.360

.720

Admiration
Interested
Sensory / Adrenaline

Severity of Consequences
Significance of Benefit
Disappoint Others
Control of Situation
Unpredictability
Skills or Abilities
Ease of Participation

Gain Experience or Information

58

Internal Reliability
Cronbach’s alpha was used to examine the internal reliability of the scale score, as
represented by facet scores (average score of the 1 - 4 items used to represent each facet).
When the scale was used to assess the activity of investing in the stock market, the
internal reliability was excellent (α = .92). Data suggested that the reliability could be
increased slightly (α = .94) by the removal of the facet “religious beliefs.” The data also
produced an excellent internal reliability value (α = .93) when it was used to assess the
activity of cheating on taxes. Again, the data suggested that the reliability could be
increased slightly (α = .94) by the removal of the facet “religious beliefs.”
Exploratory Factor Analysis
The assumptions for factor analysis are an adequate sample size, absence of
influential data points, normality, and absence of multicollinearity or singularity.
Normality of the data for investing in the stock market was first assessed using the
Kolmogorov – Smirnov test, which produced a significant statistic for all but one of the
items, indicating non-normality. As suggested by Field (2018), normality was also
assessed using a combination of Q – Q plots and skew and kurtosis values. The Q – Q
plots displayed S-shaped curves, suggested that the data was skewed. According to
Coolican (2009, as cited in Mayers,2013) skew and kurtosis values should be less than
two times greater than their standard error. In the current study, seven of the items
produced skew values outside of the acceptable range, and four of the items produced
kurtosis values outside of the acceptable range. To assess for influential data points,
standardized z-scores were saved into the data file. None of the z-scores exceeded
Tabachnick and Fidell’s (2007) suggested cut-off z-score of 3.29. As suggested by Field
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(2018) multicollinearity and singularity were assessed using bivariate correlations (<.80)
and the correlation matrix determinant (>.00001), which supported the absence of
multicollinearity or singularity in the current study. The sample size for this study (N =
84) did not meet Nunnally’s (1978) estimated requirement of ten cases per variable, and
also fell below Comrey and Lee’s (1992) sample size requirements, which states that a
good sample size for exploratory factor analysis requires a minimum of 300 participants.
Examination of the SCREE plot suggested the retention of two factors. The Kaiser
Guttman rule (eigenvalue >1) suggested the retention of six factors. The cumulative
percentage of variance accounted for increased from two factors (42.61%) to three factors
(47.96%), and then slowed, only reaching 56.91% at six factors.
Normality of the data for the risky activity of slightly cheating on taxes was also
assessed using the Kolmogorov – Smirnov test, which produced a significant statistic for
all of the items, indicating non-normality. Normality was also assessed using a
combination of Q – Q plots and skew and kurtosis values, as suggested by Field (2018).
The Q – Q plots displayed S-shaped curves, suggested that the data was skewed.
Additionally, 15 of the items produced skew values outside of the acceptable range, and
eight of the items produced kurtosis values outside of the acceptable range (Coolican,
2009, as cited in Mayers, 2013). To assess for influential data points, standardized zscores were saved into the data file. None of the z-scores exceeded Tabachnick and
Fidell’s (2007) suggested cut-off z-score of 3.29. As suggested by Field (2018)
multicollinearity and singularity were assessed using bivariate correlations (<.80) and the
correlation matrix determinant (>.00001), which supported the absence of
multicollinearity or singularity in the current study. As with the data described above
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(activity of investing in the stock market), the sample size for this study (N = 84) did not
meet Nunnally’s (1978) estimated requirement of ten cases per variable, and also fell
below Comrey and Lee’s (1992) sample size requirements (minimum of 300
participants). Examination of the SCREE plot suggested the retention of one factor. The
Kaiser Guttman rule (eigenvalue >1) suggested the retention of eight factors. The
cumulative percentage of variance accounted for increased from one factor (33.02%) to
two factors (41.19%), and continued in small incremental increases, only reaching
62.98% at eight factors.
The decision was made not to proceed with exploratory factor analyses in the
current study, due to the violations in assumptions for data from both risky activities
under study (investing in the stock market and slightly cheating on taxes).
Study 2 Discussion
One of the goals of the current study was to confirm that the main scale items
developed in Study 1-B best represented their relative facets. These main items had been
developed in Study 1-B to represent the facets of risk perception, and the number of main
question items for each facet reflected the relative importance that participants had
assigned to each of the risk facets in their overall risk perception. However, the phrasing
of the main questions had been determined subjectively. Therefore, the current study was
used to examine if any additional question items would better represent their respective
facet of risk perception. Analyses supported the use of the 47 main question items that
had been developed in Study 1-B, as there was insufficient evidence that any of the added
items contributed both quantitatively and conceptually to the facets of risk perception.
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A second goal of the current study was to examine whether these quantitative data
would provide support for the weighting of facets that had been determined with
qualitative data in Study 1-B. The data from the current study was unsuccessful in
supporting the findings from Study 1-B. Specifically, when using regression analysis, the
vast majority of risk-perception facets did not appear to make a significant contribution to
the para-risk perception score for either of the risky activities, even though they had all
been identified as important facets of risk perception during scale development in Study
1B, and many of them had also been identified as important facets of risk perception in
past literature (e.g., Benthin et al., 1993b; Hampson et al.,2001b). Additionally, there
were large differences in the relative contributions of stock facet scores on the stock pararisk-perception score, as compared to the contributions of tax facet scores on the tax pararisk-perception score. In other words, participants identified many of the risk-perception
facets as relatively important for one type of risk, but not for the other. For example, the
risk-perception facet of severity of consequences appeared to make a significant
contribution to the para-risk perception score when used to assess the risky activity of
investing in the stock market (b = 1.139, t = 2.199, p = .032), but not when used to assess
the risky activity of slightly cheating on taxes, such as exaggerating expenses (b = -.018, t
= .032, p = .975).
It was anticipated that the current data would have to be used in combination with
the qualitative data from Study 1-B, since the two forms of risky activities chosen for this
study (investing in stocks and cheating on taxes) were not able to represent all forms of
activities that involve risk (e.g., health risks, social risks, recreational risks, etc.).
Therefore, the two risky activities chosen for this study had been used with the
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understanding that they would be unable to fully elicit all facets involved in risk
perception. Since the interviews performed in Study 1-B had included a much broader
range of risk types, the current study was performed with acknowledgement that data
analyses would need to include information from the qualitative analyses of interviews
performed in Study 1B, and that the information from the comprehensive interviews in
Study 1B would need to be weighted more heavily in decisions regarding the removal of
any items and scoring procedures. The requirement to weight qualitative information
more heavily was amplified by limitations to the current study.
The main limitations of the current study were that the final sample (N = 89) was
extremely small and data may have suffered from participant fatigue effects due to the
length of the questionnaire. However, the extent of fatigue effects was difficult to
determine, since participant responses were expected to differ when completing the
HARP scale for the risky activity of investing in the stock market, as compared to when it
was completed for the risky activity of slightly cheating on taxes. The decision was made
not to extend data collection, as the data were not able to meet expectations of
contributing to facet weighting.
Due to the limitations of the current study, the results from Study 1-B were given
full value in determining the weighting of risk-perception facets for the HARP Scale.
Nonetheless, the averaged facet scores produced excellent internal reliability scores for
the scale, indicating that they were all measuring the same construct. The only facet that
lowered the internal reliability of the scale was the risk-perception facet that assessed
religious beliefs. While this facet did lower the internal reliability of the scale for both of
the risky activities under study, the reliability was lowered a negligible amount (.01 -
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.02), and the internal reliability remained in the excellent range (> .90), even with
inclusion of the Religion facet. The decision was made to retain this facet of risk
perception, since data from Study 1-B indicated that this facet has much more influence
on risk perception for some perceivers when other forms of risky activities are being
considered, such as gambling. Therefore, the scale that proceeded for psychometric
evaluation consisted of 26 risk-perception facets, represented by 47 main question items,
with each risk-perception facet having 1 - 4 items, based on the relative importance of the
facet’s importance that had been determined in Study 1-B.
While not a goal of the study, attempts were made to perform exploratory factor
analyses on the data. These attempts were unsuccessful, possibly due to violations of the
assumptions associated with these analyses. Nonetheless, these attempts provided some
useful information. For example, examination of the diagnostic information supported the
absence of multicollinearity or singularity. Additionally, the eigenvalues and scree plots
suggested a different number of factors dependent on the risk type (risk domain) under
study. This suggests that any future attempts to identify subscales may require multiple
analyses, examining a variety of different risk domains.
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CHAPTER 4
Study 3
Study 3 was designed as a psychometric evaluation of the Holistic Appraisal of
Risk Perception (HARP) Scale, and assessed the internal reliability, convergent validity,
discriminant validity, and concurrent validity.
The hypotheses tested in Study 3 were:
H1: The Holistic Assessment of Risk Perception scale will demonstrate
convergent validity with moderate correlations to conceptually similar phenomena
(risk perception/risk attitude scales).
H2: The Holistic Assessment of Risk Perception scale will demonstrate
discriminant validity with less than 20% shared variance with sensation seeking.
H3: The Holistic Assessment of Risk Perception scale will demonstrate concurrent
validity with moderate correlations to measures of risk behaviour.
H4: The Holistic Assessment of Risk Perception scale will demonstrate internal
reliability with high Cronbach alpha values (α ≥ .80).
Methods
Study 3 was a psychometric evaluation of the reliability and validity of the new
Holistic Assessment of Risk Perception (HARP) Scale, using non-experimental
(correlational) methods. The conventions put forward by Cohen (1988) were used for
interpretation of correlational relationships; wherein, a correlation coefficient of .10 is
thought to represent a weak or small association;.30 is considered a moderate correlation;
and.50 or larger is thought to represent a strong or large correlation.

65

Participants
A sample of 421 participants was recruited through the psychology participant
pool (n = 192), Facebook social media (n = 111), Qualtrics recruitment panel (n = 107)
and RSearch recruitment panel (n = 11), with no inclusion criteria. The Qualtrics
recruitment panel is a third-party service that recruits participant panels from other
recruitment services. Researchers pay Qualtrics for the service, and Qualtrics
compensates the participants. The RSearch recruitment panel is similar in nature to the
participant pool, in that researchers are responsible to compensate participants directly;
however, the pool of potential participants is drawn from a more diverse population than
undergraduate students. The RSearch service is a platform created by a Canadian
university that is intended to help connect researchers and potential participants.
Students recruited through the Psychology Participant Pool received 0.5 bonus
points for up to 30 minutes of participation. Participants recruited through social media or
RSearch were entered into a draw, with the chance of winning a fifty-dollar ($50) gift
card. Participants recruited through RSearch were also eligible to earn points through the
RSearch recruitment system. Participants recruited through Qualtrics were compensated
directly by the Qualtrics service for their participation. The amount of compensation was
based on the individual agreements that participants had entered into with their
independent crowdsourcing platforms (see Footnote 1). Regardless of the recruitment
source, the exclusionary criteria for all participants included any persons who participated
in Study 1-B or Study 2.
__________________________
1

The RSearch recruitment and the Qualtrics Panel recruitment strategies were completed as part of
a pilot study funded by the University of Windsor Office of Research & Innovation Services, in an attempt
to examine existing recruitment options for researchers.
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All data obtained through the RSearch recruitment panels (n = 11) were found to
have no indications of non-serious reporting or missing data. Therefore, all data from the
RSearch recruitment panels were retained for analyses. The data obtained through the
psychology participant pool (n = 192) included five cases of withdrawn data, one
incomplete case, and 19 cases that were identified as non-serious reporting (identified by
response sets and unreasonably short completion times). The data that were obtained
through Facebook social media (n = 111) included 15 incomplete cases and two cases
that were identified as non-serious reporting. There was a much higher proportion of nonserious reporting cases (64.5%) identified in the data from the Qualtrics recruitment
panels. All invalid data were removed prior to analyses of the final sample (N = 310). All
final scale scores were compared using one-way ANOVA of group means, with groups
defined as recruitment sources. Post-hoc Games-Howell comparisons did not reveal any
patterns of significant differences between groups.
The final sample was mostly female (77%, n = 239), but fairly diverse in other
characteristics, such as age (M = 30.87, SD = 15.42) and ethnicity (72.6%
White/European/Caucasian; 6.5% Black/African/Caribbean; 5.8% Middle Eastern; 4.2%
East Asian/Chinese/Japanese; 2.3% Latin/South American; 1.9% South
Asian/Indian/Pakistani; 1% Indigenous/ First Nations/Metis; 3.5% Multiple ethnicities;
1.9% Other).
Measures
Demographic Questionnaire
This questionnaire was used to collect information about the participants’ gender,
age, and ethnicity, for the purpose of describing the sample. It also contained questions to
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assess if the participant had any extraneous factors that might influence their risk-taking
behaviours (e.g., religious beliefs or legal restrictions such as age that prohibit gambling).
Please see Appendix B.
Holistic Assessment of Risk Perception (HARP) Scale
The HARP Scale is the measure under psychometric evaluation during this study.
The HARP Scale contains 47 items that assess 26 different facets of risk perception, such
as the participants’ perceptions of the control they have to influence the outcome of the
risky activity. Please see Appendix K. The HARP Scale is intended to be used with any
type of risk, wherein participants are provided with a risky activity that they are to
consider while rating their risk perception. For the current study, participants were
provided with two risky situations: (1) Skydiving; (2) Buying a $50 lottery ticket from a
charity organization. While these two risk-taking situations do not fully represent risky
situations that would elicit the full spectrum of risk-perception facets, the were believed
to be sufficiently diverse to elicit a fair number of facets.
Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (DOSPERT) Scale
Weber and colleagues (2002) created this scale to assess a variety of risk-taking
activities in six domains. Only the risk domains of gambling and recreational risks were
used in this study. All three of the DOSPERT subscales were used to assess risk
perception, expected benefits, and the likelihood of engaging in each of the risk-taking
activities. The DOSPERT items being used for this study included a total of 12 items (8
recreational risk; 4 gambling), which were rated on a five-point scale for each of the Risk
Perception, Expected Benefits, and Likelihood of Involvement subscales. An additional
six items were added to the gambling subscale to assess a broader range of gambling
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activities. For example, in addition to items such as “Gambling a week’s income at a
casino,” items such as “Buying a $10 scratch ticket” and “Playing poker online for
money” were added to represent lower-stake gambling activities. Please see Appendix C.
Cognitive Appraisal of Risky Events (CARE) Scale
Similar to the DOSPERT Scale, Fromme and colleagues (1997) created the
Cognitive Appraisal of Risky Events Scale (CARE) to assess a variety of risk-taking
activities in six domains. Only the risk domain of high-risk sports was used in this study.
All three of the CARE subscales were used to measure expected risk, expected benefits,
and expected involvement. The high-risk sports domain of the CARE scale includes a
total of four items, which are rated on a seven-point scale for each of the Expected Risk,
Expected Benefit, and Expected Involvement subscales. Please see Appendix L.
Gambling Behaviour Survey
This survey was created for use in a past study (Craig, 2014), and contains
questions to assess participants’ likelihood of engaging in gambling behaviours. The
survey contains 15 items that are rated on a seven-point scale that ranges from “no
chance” to “definitely.” Some of the items for this survey were taken from the Canadian
Adolescent Gambling Inventory (CAGI; Trembay et al., 2010), with adjustments made to
reflect gambling behaviours found in young adult populations. Craig reported good
internal consistency, as measured by Cronbach’s alpha (α = .89). The gambling
behaviours of interest for this study included scratch tickets, lottery tickets, casino games,
and internet gambling (Please see Appendix M).
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Brief Sensation Seeking Scale (BSSS)
Created by Hoyle and colleagues (2002), this scale was created based on items
from Form V of the Sensation Seeking Scale (SSS-V; Zuckerman et al., 1978). The BSSS
contains eight items that are scored on a five-point Likert-type scale ranging from
“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. The scale is divided into four subscales: (1)
Experience Seeking, (2) Boredom Susceptibility, (3) Thrill and Adventure seeking, and
(4) Disinhibition. The authors were able to provide evidence in support of the reliability
and validity of this scale, using samples totaling more than 7,000 participants over two
studies. Please see Appendix N.
Procedure
The study took place online, using the Qualtrics online survey platform.
Participants were first presented with the consent form. Those who consented to
participate in the study were asked to complete the HARP Scale for the activity of
skydiving, followed by the CARE subscales for the high-risk sport domain, and the
DOSPERT subscales for the recreational-risks domain. Participants were then asked to
complete the HARP a second time for the activity of buying a $50 scratch ticket from a
charitable organization. This was followed by the DOSPERT subscales for the gambling
domain, the Gambling Behaviour Survey, the Brief Sensation Seeking Scale, and the
demographic questionnaire. These measures were then followed by a letter of information
to explain the purpose of the study in greater detail, and allowed participants to withdraw
their data if they felt that they had not provided honest, thoughtful answers.
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Results
Pattern analyses was used to examine missing data. All missing data was found to
be missing at random. Necessary items from the new HARP scale were reverse scored
with the result of all higher scores representing participants’ perception of the activity as
a negative risk. Reverse scoring was completed for necessary items from all other tests in
accordance with test instructions, prior to calculation of the scale and subscale scores.
However, scoring procedures for the DOSPERT Scale were not followed, as these would
have produced risk attitude scores, rather than risk perception scores. Instead, the
DOSPERT Expected Benefits subscale was subtracted from the DOSPERT Risk
Perception subscale to create risk balance scores. Positive balance scores represent
participants who consider that particular risk unfavourably (more expected negative
consequences than benefits); whereas, negative scores represent participants who
consider that particular risk favourably (more perceived benefits than negative
consequences). This procedure was followed for both the gambling and recreational-risk
domains of the DOSPERT Scale. Similarly, the CARE scoring procedure was altered, so
that the Expected Benefit subscale scores were subtracted from the Expected Risk
subscale scores, producing risk balance scores to represent the risk as favorable (negative
balance scores) or unfavorable (negative balance scores). It should also be noted that the
risk balance scores produced from the DOSPERT and CARE scales exhibited standard
deviation scores that were higher in value than the mean score for each respective scale,
which indicates poor reliability.
The HARP Scale was examined for inter-item correlations. Similar to the
previous study, Spearman’s correlation coefficients were used for item-level analyses as
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they are more appropriate for ordinal level data (Field, 2018). Results found that many of
the items were highly correlated. However, the highest inter-item correlational values
when the scale was used to assess the activity of skydiving was between the item “It
would be really exciting/pleasurable” and the item “I would find it entertaining”, rs(305)
= .77, p < .001. These same two items had a much lower correlational value when used to
assess the activity of buying a lottery ticket, rs(303) = .55. Similarly, the highest
correlational value when the scale was used to assess the activity of buying a lottery
ticket was the item “People I care about might be ashamed of me if I did this” and the
item “I would be embarrassed if people knew I did this”, rs(306) = .72, p <.001. These
same two items had a much lower correlational value when the scale was used to assess
the activity of skydiving, rs(307) = .55. These results did not suggest any issues with
singularity or multicollinearity, as no values were above the threshold (> .80) indicated
by Field (2018). Additionally, the items that were highly correlated when examining one
type of risk were correlated to a lesser extent when examining another type of risk.
Cronbach’s alpha was used to assess the internal reliability of each scale and
subscale used in the current study. The new HARP scale exhibited excellent internal
reliability (> .90), as did the Gambling Behaviour Survey (GBS). Most of the other
subscales exhibited good internal reliability scores (>.80 alpha <.90), with a few
exceptions; however, none of the subscales exhibited internal reliability scores below the
acceptable range (>.70 alpha <.80). Please see Table 7 for internal reliability scores and
descriptive information from all scales and subscales used in the current study.
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Table 7: Scale and Subscale Reliabilities (Cronbach’s alpha) for all measures (N = 310)

Scale

Number
of Scale
Items

Mean

SD

Alpha

HARP: Skydiving

47

174.16

37.65

.93

HARP: Lottery Play

47

163.69

30.76

.90

Expected Benefits

8

21.17

6.06

.82

Risk Perception

8

29.36

4.37

.71

Risk Balance

-

8.19

8.67

-

Likelihood of Involvement

8

18.03

6.75

.80

Expected Benefits

10

21.88

7.78

.93

Risk Perception

10

31.99

6.27

.83

-

10.11

11.54

-

10

19.05

6.77

.83

Expected Benefits

4

21.34

4.17

.85

Expected Risk

4

15.03

4.77

.78

Risk Balance

-

-6.31

6.70

-

Expected Involvement

4

16.04

6.79

.81

Gambling Behaviour Survey

15

44.48

17.71

.93

Brief Sensation Seeking Scale

8

24.29

6.28

.79

DOSPERT Recreational Risk

DOSPERT Gambling Risk

Risk Balance
Likelihood of Involvement
CARE High-Risk Sports Domain
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Convergent Validity
Convergent validity was assessed by examining the relationship between the
HARP Scale and the risk-perception balance scale scores that had been produced from
the DOSPERT and CARE scales. First, the HARP scale (risk activity of skydiving) was
examined with the CARE risk-balance score from the domain of high-risk sports, r(308)
= .29, p < .001, and the DOSPERT risk-balance score from the domain of recreational
risks, r(308) = .43, p < .001. Next, the HARP scale (risk activity of buying a $50 lottery
ticket) was examined with the DOSPERT risk-balance score from the domain of
gambling risks, r (308) = .30, p < .001. These low to moderate correlational relationships
between the HARP Scale and conceptually similar phenomena provide some evidence in
support of convergent validity.
Discriminant Validity
Discriminant validity was assessed by examining the relationship between the
HARP Scale and the Brief Sensation-Seeking Scale (BSSS). Relationships between the
BSSS and HARP were examined separately for the risk activity of skydiving, r(308) =
-.54, p < .001, and the risk activity of buying a $50 lottery ticket from a charity
organization, r(308) = -.09, p = .109. The shared variance between the HARP Scale and
sensation-seeking when examining a recreational risk (R2 = .29) was very dissimilar from
the shared variance between the HARP Scale and sensation-seeking when examining a
financial risk (R2 = .01); providing evidence to partially support discriminant validity, in
that the two scales (HARP and BSSS) are not measuring the same construct.
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Concurrent Validity
Concurrent validity was assessed by the relationship between the HARP Scale
and measures of risk-taking behaviour, including the DOSPERT Likelihood of
Involvement subscale (in the domains of gambling and recreational risks), the CARE
Expected Involvement subscale (in the domain of high-risk sports), and the Gambling
Behaviour Survey. First, the HARP scale for the risk activity of skydiving was examined
with the DOSPERT Likelihood of Involvement subscale in the domain of recreational
risks, r(308) = -.50, p < .001, and the CARE Expected Involvement subscale in the
domain of high-risk sports, r(308) = -.34, p < .001. Next, the HARP scale for the risk
activity of gambling (buying a $50 lottery ticket) was examined with the DOSPERT
Likelihood of Involvement subscale in the domain of gambling, r(308) = -.31, p < .001,
and the Gambling Behaviour Survey, r(308) = -.33, p < .001. These moderate to high
correlational values between participants’ scores on the HARP Scale and their reported
conceptually-similar behaviours provide evidence in support of concurrent validity.
Discussion
The ability for the DOSPERT and CARE scales to assess both perceived benefits
and perceived consequences in various risk domains made these scales amenable to
alternative scoring methods to produce risk-balance scores. These risk-balance scores
were used to assess the convergent validity, because even though they did not incorporate
assessment of individual facets of risk perception, they did represent both perceived
benefits and perceived consequences of risk domains that resembled the risks under study
(skydiving and lottery). It was hypothesized that the Holistic Assessment of Risk
Perception scale would demonstrate convergent validity with moderate correlational
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relationships to conceptually similar phenomena (i.e., risk-balance scores from the
DOSPERT and CARE scales). This hypothesis was supported, with most correlational
values indicating moderate relationships.
To assess the discriminant validity of the HARP scale, it was hypothesized that
the HARP would not share more than 20% of its variance with the Brief SensationSeeking Scale (BSSS). This hypothesis was only partially supported, as the HARP scale
only shared 1% of its variance with the BSSS when used to assess the risk activity of
buying a lottery ticket, but it shared 29.16% of its variance with the BSSS when used to
assess the risk activity of skydiving. Past research (e.g., Zuckerman, 2007) has identified
a strong relationship between sensation seeking and risky behaviour; however, sensation
seeking is only one of the many facets of risk perception assessed by the HARP Scale. It
is possible that consideration of an activity like skydiving created a halo effect for those
high in sensation-seeking, such as the halo effect discussed by Weber and colleagues
(2002), in which greater expected benefits (e.g., thrill sensation) were associated with
smaller perceived risk consequences. Nonetheless, the results support discriminant
validity in that if the scales were measuring the same construct, the shared variance
between the HARP Scale and the BSSS would be similar, regardless of the type of risk
measured. Therefore, the disparate measures of shared variance when the scales are used
to examine different types of risk provide evidence in support of discriminant validity.
To assess concurrent validity, moderate relationships were hypothesized between
risk perception, as measured by the HARP Scale, and risk-taking behaviour. In the
current study, risk-taking behaviour was measured using the Likelihood of Involvement
subscale from the DOSPERT (recreation risks domain and gambling domains), as well as

76

the Expected Involvement subscale from the CARE (high-risk sports domain), and the
Gambling Behaviour Survey (GBS). Concurrent validity was fully supported with
moderate to high relationships between the HARP Scale and all above measures of risky
behaviour.
To examine reliability, it was hypothesized that the Holistic Assessment of Risk
Perception scale would demonstrate internal reliability with high Cronbach alpha values
(α ≥ .80). This hypothesis was supported with Cronbach alpha values in the excellent
range (α >.90) when the HARP scale was used to examine both the recreational risk of
skydiving (α =.93) and the financial risk of lottery play (α =.90). Internal reliability was
the only form of reliability measured in the current project since the HARP scale is
intended to assess a person’s current perception of risky activities, not the stability of
their risk perception over time; thus, making test-retest reliability inappropriate for this
study.
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CHAPTER 5
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The first pair of studies in the current project provided qualitative data that was
used to identify facets of risk perception and determine their relative importance in
people’s determinations of activities as being good risks or bad risks. The procedures
used in these studies were designed to minimize the possibility of introducing the
confounds of risk-taking behaviour and cognitive bias during scale development.
Specifically, Study 1A was used to assess the extent of cognitive biases and risk-taking
behaviour of potential participants for Study 1B. Participants who were willing to
participate in Study 1B were assigned to groups based on the dimensions of high-or-low
bias and high-or-low-risk. The interviews from Study 1B provided rich data that
represented participants’ perceptions of a very broad range of risky activities. These risky
activities spanned across multiple risk domains, including among others, financial,
physical/health, social, recreational, ethical, and legal risks. The unstructured interviews
provided participants the opportunity to fully explore their thoughts and perceptions of
these activities. Therefore, these interview data made it possible to identify a wide
breadth of risk facets that are involved in a person’s perception of activities as being good
risks or bad risks.
Participants also made several explicit statements during the interviews regarding
the relative importance of various risk facets in their overall consideration of risky
activities. For example, even if a risky activity was appealing to the participant in regard
to many risk facets (e.g., admiration of activity, social benefits), they would still perceive
it as a bad risk if they considered the activity ethically “wrong” or if the possible
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consequences had potential to be very severe (i.e., participation in an activity possibly
resulting in a long-term disability or incarceration). For this reason, the risk-perception
facets that were identified by participants as being more important in risk perception were
weighted more heavily in scale construction. Scale items were constructed to best
represent each of their respective facets of risk perception. The facets that were weighted
more heavily in participants’ risk perception were represented by a greater number of
scale items that reflected the relative importance that participants placed on that specific
risk-perception facet.
The second study in this project was intended to provide quantitative data to
support weighting of the facets within the scale. Study 2 was unsuccessful, due to the
extreme variability in facet endorsement that was based on the type of risk (e.g., social
risk, financial risk) being perceived. Therefore, the decision was made to weight
information from the previous qualitative study (Study 1-B) much more heavily in
decisions regarding scale refinement.
The same limitation that restricted mixed-methods analyses in Study 2, also
introduced a limitation when using the HARP scale to assess risk perception across
different risk domains. A goal of the current project was to expand on the findings from
past research (Benthin et al., 1993a; Fischhoff et al., 1978; Hampson et al., 2001a), which
had each identified between 9 and 14 risk facets that were used to assess risk perception
of relatively specific types of risk. The current project identified 26 risk perception facets
for the HARP scale, with the goal of being able to use the scale to assess perception of a
variety of risky activities across all risk domains, such as recreational risks, health risks,
academic risks, financial risks, and others. However, the results from these studies show
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that some facets of risk perception may not be salient to participants at the time of risk
perception. Additionally, some facets of risk perception may not even be applicable to
some forms of risky activities. For example, the risk-perception facet of ethical
considerations may not have clear application to some forms of risky behaviour, such as
investing in a new house. In some other situations, such as choosing to take harder
courses, ethical considerations would likely not be salient to students when they are
considering the activity as a good risk or a bad risk, even though course options may have
ethical implications in the future by better preparing student to fulfill their duties in their
chosen occupations. For some other forms of risky activities, the risk-perception facet of
ethical considerations would be very salient and applicable, such as in the perception of
legal risks like shoplifting or illicit drug use.
These findings are consistent with past research (e.g., Schoemaker, 1990, Slovic
et al., 1986; Weber et al., 2002) that found risk perception to be specific to the domain, or
type of risk under study. For this reason, all facets of risk perception were retained, but a
“non-applicable (n/a)” response option was added to the HARP scale to increase the
scale’s suitability for assessing perception across broad range of risky activities. As stated
by Parker and colleagues (2011), it is necessary to investigate the possibility of
multidimensionality in complex constructs in order to move research forward. While the
HARP Scale is thought to be a unidimensional construct, future research could be used to
examine the scale’s structure. This may be able to negate the necessity for a “nonapplicable” response option by performing multiple studies, with each study only
assessing risky activities from one risk domain. Factor analyses could then be used to
identify any subscales that are not applicable to specific risk domains.
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Despite the inability to use mixed methods in Study 2 for scale refinement, the
results from qualitative analyses in Study 1-B proved to be sufficient in refining the
HARP scale prior to the evaluation of reliability and validity in the final study. The
psychometric evaluation (Study 3) was successful in providing evidence to support both
the reliability and validity of the HARP scale. Internal consistency was the only form of
reliability assessed in the current project due to logistical considerations. However, future
studies may find relationships between risk perception and more stable constructs, such
as personality or global risk aversion. If these types of shared relationships are found in
future studies, it may be beneficial to examine the test-retest reliability of the HARP
scale. Nonetheless, evidence from the current study supported the concurrent, convergent,
and discriminant validity of the HARP scale. Additionally, the conceptual similarity
between risk facets utilized in past measures (Benthin et al., 1993a; Fischhoff et al., 1978;
Hampson et al., 2001a) and 18 of the risk-perception facets from the HARP scale,
provides supportive evidence of face validity.
Previous work by Fischhoff and colleagues (1978) had identified nine dimensions
that had been predicted to influence risk perception. All of these dimensions shared
conceptual similarities with risk perception facets identified in the current project.
Similarly, all 14 of the risk facets identified by Benthin and colleagues (1993a) and all
ten risk facets identified by Hampson and colleagues (2001a) shared conceptual
similarities with risk perception facets identified in the current project (see Appendix I).
While the remaining eight HARP risk perception facets did not appear as risk facets in
previous risk-perception measures, many do share similarities to aspects mentioned in
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other risk literature (e.g., Cruwys et al., 2021; Lauriola et al., 2014; Nicholson et al.,
2005; Vlek & Stallen, 1980; Zuckerman & Kuhlman, 2000).
The concept of risk perception shares conceptual similarities with several other
constructs, including among others, risk acceptance, risk choice, and risk preference.
Distinctions between many of these constructs varies by discipline and theoretical
foundation. For example, the risk-value (R–V) models (e.g., Bell & Fishburn, 2001; Jia et
al., 1999; Sarin & Weber, 1993) state that risky choice is a compromise between risk and
value, in that a person can judge the riskiness of an activity accurately, yet still prefer a
higher-risk option over a lower risk option. Sokolowska (2006) discussed how these
models depend on risk judgement and risk preferences being two distinct processes. Her
research provided evidence that aspirations influence risk preferences, but not risk
judgement, which supports the R–V models.
While there are conceptual similarities between the concept of risk preference
presented in the R–V models and the concept of risk perception presented in the current
project, there is also a conceptual difference between these constructs. Specifically, risk
preference, as detailed in the R–V theory, refers to the participant’s preference of one
activity over another; whereas, risk perception as evaluated by the HARP scale refers to
the participant’s perception of a risky activity being a good risk or a bad risk, independent
of any other risky activity.
The HARP Scale was developed using a different conceptualization of risk
perception than has been set forth in previous research. In this project, risk perception is
investigated as a holistic construct that acknowledges all risk-taking activities as having
both positive and negative components, or facets. While a person’s decision to engage in
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risky behaviour may be influenced by his or her perception of the activity as a good risk,
a person may consider an activity to be a good risk, but not have motivation to actually
engage in the activity. Therefore, it is important to note that the HARP scale is intended
to assess perception independently from risk propensity or risk-taking behaviour.
Grounded in Decisional Balance Theory (Janis & Mann, 1977), this project
provides evidence to support the proposition that people weigh several perceived facets
of risk, which culminate in their overall perception of the activity as a good risk or a bad
risk. However, some findings were inconsistent with Decisional Balance Theory.
Specifically, participants’ perceptions of activities being a good risk or a bad risk were
not the result of a simple balancing of number of benefits to number of consequences,
because some benefits and consequences were weighted more heavily in participants’
judgements of the activity being a good risk or a bad risk. In fact, the proportion of
benefits to consequences was only one of the 26 risk-perception facets identified by
participants, and only received the basic weighting (1 of 47) in creation of the HARP
scale. Nonetheless, the Decisional Balance Theory did contribute the foundational
structure for the current study, in that people weigh the importance of the possible
positive and negative outcomes of an activity, and form a decision as to whether that
specific activity is a good risk or a bad risk.
The HARP Scale contributes to the study of risk by providing a measure that can
be used to study relationships between risk perception and a variety of constructs
including both cognitive biases and risk-taking behaviour. Care was taken in the
development of this scale to ensure that this measure of risk perception was not conflated
with cognitive bias or risk-taking behaviour. This should aid in future research projects;
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particularly, in those examining relationships between bias, behaviour, and perception.
This scale also produces a single score for risk perception, which contributes to its
flexibility and ease of use. This is an important consideration, as one of the intended
implications of this research is to stimulate further research in the area of risk perception.
It should also be noted that all data for this project was collected prior to the global
pandemic that began in 2020. Future research may wish to examine any possible changes
in risk perception that may have been influenced by the pandemic.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: Pilot Study
Positive thought-action fusion is a cognitive bias that has only recently been
identified as an independent construct (Craig & Lafreniere, 2016). As a result, there is
very little evidence to substantiate the subscale structure of the P-TAF Scale. Craig and
Lafreniere (2016) hypothesized that the subscale structure of the P-TAF Scale would be
similar to the subscale structure of the TAF-R (Shafran, et al., 1996), because the TAF-R
had been used as a theoretical model during the construction of the P-TAF Scale.
However, an exploratory factor analysis provided evidence that the P-TAF subscale
structure differed from the structure that had been hypothesized (Craig & Lafreniere,
2016).
In addition, past work by Craig (2014) provided evidence of a relationship
between positive thought-action fusion and some forms of risk-taking behaviour.
However, the specific nature of this relationship has yet to be determined. It is also
unclear why this cognitive bias may be implicated in some types of risk-taking behaviour,
but not in others. The purpose of this pilot study was to provide additional evidence that
can be used to help delineate the relationship between positive thought-action fusion and
risky behaviour. Additionally, a large sample was collected for this study so that a
confirmatory factor analysis could be used to provide additional evidence of the subscale
structure of the P-TAF Scale.
The hypotheses of the pilot study were:
H1: Participants who score high on the P-TAF Scale will report higher levels of
risk propensity.
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H2: There is a difference in the quality or type of risk perceptions between
participants who score high on the P-TAF scale and those who do not.
H3: A confirmatory factor analysis will support the P-TAF subscale structure
found in previous work by Craig and Lafreniere (2016).
Method
Participants
A sample of 310 participants was obtained through the University of Windsor’s
Psychology participant pool. Due to the exploratory nature of a pilot study, there were no
exclusionary criteria for participation. Students received 0.5 bonus points for 30 minutes
of participation. The resulting sample was a diverse representation of the student
population for both age (range = 18 to 32; M = 20.86) and ethnicity (White / European =
69%, Black / African / Caribbean = 5.5%, Latin / South American = 1%, East Asian /
Chinese / Japanese = 6.8%, South Asian / Indian / Pakistan = 4.5%, Middle Eastern =
7.4%, Multiracial = 4.8%, No Response = 1%). There was an overrepresentation of
female students in the sample (Female = 80%, Male = 18.7%, Non-Binary = 0.3%, No
Response = 1%), which is common with samples drawn from the participant pool.
Measures
Positive Thought-Action Fusion Scale (P -TAF). Developed by Craig and
Lafreniere (2016), this 26-item scale measures the positive dimension of the thoughtaction fusion phenomenon on a seven-point scale that ranges from “strongly disagree” to
“strongly agree.” An exploratory analysis (Craig & Lafreniere, 2016) provided evidence
for a five-subscale structure that included Others (α = .91), Self (α = .84), Financial Gain
(α = .86), Moral (α = .75), and Ethical / Global Concern (α = .76).
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Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (DOSPERT) Scale (Weber et al., 2002). This
scale measures a variety of risk-taking activities with the use of six subscales: Ethical,
Investment, Gambling, Health/Safety, Recreational, and Social. The DOSPERT Scale
contains a total of 40 items, and participants are asked to rate them on a five-point scale
that ranges from “very unlikely” to “very likely.” While the DOSPERT scale can be used
to assess risk perception and/or expected benefits, the current study only assessed the
participants’ likelihood of engaging in each of the activities as a measure of risk-taking
behaviour.
Qualitative Assessment of Risky Activities. This measure was created for the
current study in order to gather information about the participants’ perceptions of risky
activities. Participants were asked to provide a detailed account of their thoughts and
feelings regarding three different risky activities: (1) Buying lottery and scratch tickets,
(2) Chasing a hurricane or tornado by car to take dramatic photos, and (3) Not wearing a
passenger seatbelt in a car.
Demographic Survey. This survey asked a variety of demographic questions
(age, gender, ethnicity, major area of study) for the purpose of describing the sample.
Procedure
This study was performed online using FluidSurvey for data collection. The
participants were first provided a consent form with details about the study. If they
agreed to participate, they received the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (DOSPERT) Scale
(Weber et al., 2002), and the Positive Thought-Action Fusion Scale (P -TAF; Craig &
Lafreniere, 2016). Participants were then asked to provide open-ended responses to the
three questions in the qualitative assessment of risky activities. These were followed by

100

the demographic survey. Participants also completed additional measures that were not
included in the current study. Participants were then provided a letter of information
describing the study in more detail, and then all participants were redirected to a separate
landing page in the survey database to submit their name for remuneration purposes.
Results
All survey responses that were terminated before completion were removed from
the data file. Analyses confirmed that all missing observations were missing at random;
therefore, a multiple imputation method was used to fill in missing data prior to analyses.
The internal reliability was examined for all scales and subscales, resulting in Cronbach’s
alpha values that ranged from adequate (α >.70) to excellent (α >.90). Please see Table 1a
for details.

Table 1a Descriptive Information for Scales used in Pilot Study
Items

M

SD

α

26
9

67.63
22.60

29.36
12.30

.95
.93

6
4
3
4

20.90
8.50
7.61
8.30

8.50
5.01
4.06
4.68

.86
.85
.79
.81

40
8
4
4

93.62
13.51
13.85
5.25

18.29
4.61
3.72
2.24

.87
.76
.82
.79

8
8
8

19.34
19.53
26.26

5.41
6.92
4.95

.67
.83
.70

P-TAF Scale
Others Subscale
Self Subscale
Financial Gain Subscale
Moral Subscale
Global / Ethical Concern Subscale
DOSPERT Scale
Ethical Subscale
Investment Subscale
Gambling Subscale
Health/Safety Subscale
Recreational Subscale
Social Subscale
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Analysis of the relationship between the P-TAF scale and risk-taking behaviours
supported relationships between positive thought-action fusion and social risk taking,
r(310) = -.156, p = .006, investment risk taking, r(310) = .166, p = .003, and gambling r(310)
= .266, p < .001. However, the results did not support relationships between positive
thought-action fusion and ethical risks, recreational risks, or health and safety risks.
Correlational relationships between the various forms of risk are detailed in Table 2a.

Table 2a Correlations Between Various Forms of Risk-Taking Behaviour
Social
Risk

Ethical
Risk

Investment
Risk

Gambling
Risk

Health &
Safety
Risk

Social Risk

--

Ethical Risk

.249**

--

Investment Risk

.148**

.203**

--

Gambling Risk

.003

.295**

.216**

--

Health & Safety Risk

.368**

.542**

.083

.182**

--

Recreational Risk

.334**

.322**

.188**

.211**

.475**

Recreation
al Risk

--

** Significant at p = .01

For Hypothesis 2, there were three qualitative responses included in the survey
that asked participants for a detailed account of their thoughts and feelings regarding
three different risky activities. Qualitative responses were analyzed using thematic
analysis. The themes that emerged from responses to the first risky activity (buying
lottery and scratch tickets) were labelled belief in luck, an aspect of control, and
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perception of a benefit other than monetary gain. The themes that emerged from the
second risky activity (chasing a hurricane or tornado by car to take dramatic photos),
included enthusiastic about the thrill of chasing storms, and enjoying thrill-seeking, but
not to that extent. The themes that emerged from the third risky activity (not wearing a
passenger seatbelt in a car) included a belief that seatbelts are not necessary, and a fear
of sanctions if not wearing a seatbelt. Qualitative responses from the survey were coded,
and participants received a nominal score for each of the themes that emerged from the
data. For example, participants who commented on an aspect of luck received a score of
1, while those who did not comment on luck received a score of zero for that specific
variable. Scores from the P-TAF scale were divided by determining cut points for three
equal groups, and then recoding the variable with the highest and lowest groups receiving
nominal values.
Chi square analyses were performed using two-by-two cross-tabulated designs,
with the nominal P-TAF values as one variable and the nominal theme scores as the other
variable. Results from all chi-square analyses were non-significant, with the exception a
relationship between positive thought-action fusion and a fear of sanctions for not
wearing a passenger seatbelt, X2 (1, N = 210) = 4.79, p =.029, with a higher number of
participants with high P-TAF scores reporting a fear of sanctions (n = 23) then expected
(n = 17.2) for not wearing seatbelts.
For Hypothesis 3, a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was performed using
Amos software. Multivariate outliers were removed (n = 29) after being identified with
Mahalanobis distance. There was still a sufficient sample size (n = 281) after removing
the outliers. The CFA compared the theoretical structure first hypothesized by Craig and
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Lafreniere (2016) and the factor structure that the authors later revealed with an
exploratory factor analysis. Results of the current study confirmed that the factor
structure that had been revealed by the exploratory factor analysis (Model 2) was a better
fit than the original hypothesized structure (Model 1). Please see Table 3a for details.

Table 3a Fit Indices for Possible Substructure of the P-TAF Scale
RMSEA C.I.
Model

χ2

df

χ2/df

RMSEA

LO

HI

CFI

TLI

1

1261.38

289

4.37

.11

.10

.12

.83

.81

2

745.97

289

2.58

.08

.07

.08

.92

.91

Model 1 = Theoretically hypothesized structure (Craig & Lafreniere, 2016)
Model 2 = Structure revealed through EFA (Craig & Lafreniere, 2016)

Discussion
The analyses for Hypothesis 1 were consistent with past research by Craig and
Lafreniere (2016), which had found evidence to support relationships between positive
thought-action fusion and some forms of risk-taking behaviour, while simultaneously
finding no evidence to support relationships between positive thought-action fusion and
other forms of risk-taking behaviours. The reasoning for these different relationships is
not supported by correlations between the risk variables. For example, there was no
significant correlation between social risks and gambling risks (r = .003, p = .957), yet
both of these forms of risk-taking behaviour were related to positive thought-action
fusion. Similarly, there was a significant relationship between health and safety risks and
social risks (r = .368, p < .001), yet social risks were related to positive thought-action
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fusion, while health and safety risks were not. These findings suggest that there may be
another variable of interest that is mediating the relationships between positive thoughtaction fusion and various forms of risk-taking behaviour.
The results for Hypothesis 2 were unanticipated, as the only statistically
significant result was in the opposite direction than would be expected. Positive thoughtaction fusion was significantly related to the participants’ fear of getting a ticket for not
wearing their seatbelt. However, the P-TAF scale contains items such as “If I think about
getting away with cheating, this increases the chance that I will get away with cheating”
(Craig & Lafreniere, 2016). Therefore, it would be expected that those with high scores
on the P-TAF scale would have less fear of retribution. It is possible that the brief, openended responses on an online questionnaire did not provide enough detail from the
participants for qualitative analysis.
The results from Hypothesis 3 were able to provide evidence in support of the PTAF subscale structure that had been revealed by Craig and Lafreniere (2016) during
exploratory factor analysis. The confirmatory factor analysis performed in the current
study was the final step in psychometric evaluation of the P-TAF scale, which validates
its subscale structure for use in future research.

105

Appendix B: Demographic Questionnaire
Gender
male
female
transgender
other (please specify) ______________________

Age at last birthday

To what racial or ethnic group do you belong?
If you belong to more than one group, please check all that apply.
White/ European
Black/ African/ Caribbean
Latin/ South American
East Asian / Chinese / Japanese
South Asian / Indian / Pakistani
Indigenous / Metis / First Nations
Middle Eastern
Bi/ Multiracial (please specify) ______________________
Other (please specify) ______________________

Is there anything, such as your age or religious beliefs, that prevents you from taking part in
gambling activities (e.g., slot machines, bingo, lottery tickets)?
Yes (please specify) ______________________________
No

Item added for Study 1A:
If selected, would you be willing to consider taking part in a follow-up interview?
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Appendix C: Domain Specific Risk Attitude (DOSPERT) Scale (Weber, Blais & Betz,
2002)
Likelihood of Engagement Scale Instructions:
For each of the following statements, please indicate your likelihood of engaging in each activity or
behavior.
Provide a rating from 1 to 5, using the following scale:
1= Very unlikely; 2= Unlikely; 3= Not sure; 4= Likely; 5= Very likely
Risk Perception Scale Instructions:
People often see some risk in situations that contain uncertainty about what the outcome or
consequences
will be and for which there is the possibility of ‘bad’ consequences. However, riskiness is a very
personal and
intuitive notion, and we are interested in your gut level assessment of how risky each situation is.
For each of the following statements, please indicate how risky you perceive each situation. Provide a
rating from 1 to 5, using the following scale:
1=Not at all risky-------- 2----------- 3=Moderately risky-----------4------------5=Extremely risky
Expected Benefits Scale Instructions:
For each of the following statements, please indicate the benefits you would obtain from each
situation.
Provide a rating from 1 to 5, using the following scale:
1=No benefits at all--------2-----------3=Moderate benefits-----------4-------------5=Great benefits

Risk Activities by Domain
Social Risks
1. Admitting that your tastes are different from those of your friends.
10. Disagreeing with your father on a major issue.
16. Arguing with a friend about an issue on which he or she has a very different opinion.
19. Approaching your boss to ask for a raise.
23. Telling a friend if his or her significant other has made a pass at you.
26. Wearing provocative or unconventional clothes on occasion.
34. Taking a job that you enjoy over one that is prestigious but less enjoyable.
35. Defending an unpopular issue that you believe in at a social occasion.
Recreational Risks
2. Going camping in the wilderness, beyond the civilization of a campground.
6. Chasing a tornado or hurricane by car to take dramatic photos.
15. Going on a vacation in a third-world country without prearranged travel and hotel
accommodations.
17. Going down a ski run that is beyond your ability or closed.
21. Going whitewater rafting during rapid water flows in the spring.
31. Periodically engaging in a dangerous sport (e.g. mountain climbing or sky diving).
37. Trying out bungee jumping at least once.
38. Piloting your own small plane, if you could.
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Gambling
3. Betting a day’s income at the horse races.
11. Betting a day’s income at a high stake poker game.
22. Betting a day’s income on the outcome of a sporting event (e.g. baseball, soccer, or football).
33. Gambling a week’s income at a casino.
Gambling subscale items added for Study 2B:
▪ Buying a $10 scratch ticket
▪ Playing poker online for money
▪ Betting $20 on slot machines at the casino
▪ Playing black jack with friends for money
▪ Buying lottery tickets when the jackpot is large
▪ Playing the same numbers on lottery tickets each week

Health and Safety Risks
4. Buying an illegal drug for your own use.
8. Consuming five or more servings of alcohol in a single evening.
27. Engaging in unprotected sex.
29. Not wearing a seatbelt when being a passenger in the front seat.
32. Not wearing a helmet when riding a motorcycle.
36. Exposing yourself to the sun without using sunscreen.
39. Walking home alone at night in a somewhat unsafe area of town.
40. Regularly eating high cholesterol foods.

Ethical Risks
5. Cheating on an exam.
9. Cheating by a significant amount on your income tax return.
12. Having an affair with a married man or woman.
13. Forging somebody’s signature.
14. Passing off somebody else’s work as your own.
20. Illegally copying a piece of software.
25. Shoplifting a small item (e.g. a lipstick or a pen).
28. Stealing an additional TV cable connection off the one you pay for.

Investment Risks
7. Investing 10% of your annual income in a moderate growth mutual fund.
18. Investing 5% of your annual income in a very speculative stock.
24. Investing 5% of your annual income in a conservative stock.
30. Investing 10% of your annual income in government bonds (treasury bills).
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Appendix D: Gamblers' Beliefs Questionnaire (GBQ) – Illusion of Control Subscale
(Steenbergh, Meyers, May, & Whelan, 2002b)

Participant Instructions:
Please read each of the following statements carefully. Rate to what extent you agree or
disagree with each statement. Each item was rated on a Likert-type scale that ranged from 1
(strongly agree) to 7 (strongly disagree).

Rating Scale:
1 = Strongly Disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Somewhat Disagree
4 = Neutral
5 = Somewhat Agree
6 = Agree
7 = Strongly Agree

Question Items:
1. I think of gambling as a challenge.
2. My knowledge and skill in gambling contribute to the likelihood that I will make
money.
3. My choices or actions affect the game on which I am betting.
4. I should keep track of previous winning bets so that I can figure out how I should bet
in the future.
5. Gambling is more than just luck.
6. My gambling wins are evidence that I have skill and knowledge related to gambling.
7. I have a “lucky” technique that I use when I gamble.
8. I have more skills and knowledge related to gambling than most people who gamble.
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Appendix E: Positive Thought-Action Fusion (P-TAF) Scale (Craig & Lafreniere, 2016)
Participant Instructions:
Please indicate the extent that you agree with the following statements.
Response Scale:
1 = Strongly Disagree; 2 = Disagree; 3 = Somewhat Disagree; 4 = Neither Agree nor
Disagree; 5 = Somewhat Agree; 6 = Agree; 7 = Strongly Agree

Question Items:
Factor 1: TAF Others
1. If I think of a relative/friend finding a new job, this increases the chance that they will get a new
job.
2. If I think of a sick relative/friend getting better, this increases the chance that they will get well.
3. If I think of my friend/relative winning an award, it increases the chance that they will win an
award.
4. Thinking of someone else being successful increases the chance that they will be successful.
5. If I think of a friend/relative avoiding a car accident, this decreases the chance that they will
have a car accident
6. If I think of a friend/relative getting home safely, this increases the likelihood that they
will get home safely.
7. If I think about my pet staying healthy, it increases the chance that they will stay healthy.
8. If I think of my car running well, it decreases the chance that my car will break down.
9. If I think about animals being friendly, it decreases the chance that I will be attacked by an
animal

Factor 2: TAF Self
10. If I think of myself winning a competition, it increases the chance that I will win.
11. If I think about being attractive, it will make my desired partner more attracted to me
12. If I think of myself in a higher position at work, it increases the chance that I will get a
promotion.
13. When I am sick, if I think about getting better, it increases the chance that I will get better.
14. If I think of myself as being popular, it will make me have more friends.
15. If I think about winning, it decreases the chance of me losing

Factor 3: TAF Financial Gain
16. If I think of myself winning while scratching lottery tickets, it will increase the chance of winning
17. If I think of a friend/relative winning the lottery, this increases the chance that they will win the
lottery.
18. If I think of myself winning the lottery, this increases my chance of winning the lottery.
19. If I think of being a millionaire, there is a better chance that I will get a million dollars
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Factor 4: TAF Moral
20. Having an honourable thought is almost as good as doing an honourable deed.
21. Thinking about helping someone else is almost the same as actually helping someone.
22. When I have a kind thought about someone else, it is almost as good as paying them a
compliment.

Factor 5: TAF Ethical / Global Concern
23. If I think of myself getting away with cheating, this increases the chance that I will get away with
cheating
24. When I hear news reports of peace talks, I know that it is because I thought about world peace.
25. If I think about the end of global warming, it will increase the chance that global warming will
end.
26. If I think that I won’t get caught speeding, it increases the chance that I will get away with
speeding.
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Appendix F: Interview Guide for Study 1-B
Preamble:
The definition of a risky activity is any activity that has the potential for positive benefits
or negative consequences. Most activities in life have some amount of risk involved. For
example, if you purchase a lottery ticket you risk financial loss. Or, if you disagree with
your friends you risk social consequences. And if you go skydiving, you are risking
injury. The purpose of our discussion today is for you to think carefully about what kinds
of things you think about when you are deciding whether or not to participate in an
activity. I am interested in hearing about everything you consider when making your
decision.
Sample questions:
1. Can you please list a few risky activities that you have considered participating in
recently?
2. Can you please describe what you were thinking the last time you participated in
[risk-taking activity 1]?
3. Can you please describe what you were thinking the last time you participated in
[risk-taking activity 2]?
4. Can you please describe how you feel about the prospect of going skydiving?
5. What did you think about the last time that you were the passenger in a vehicle, and
you were deciding whether or not to wear a seatbelt?
6. Have you ever bought a scratch ticket?
a. Can you tell me why you decided (not) to purchase a ticket?

Prompts (may be used to explore initial responses to any of the above questions):
i.

What are your thoughts about the possible benefits from [activity]?

ii.

What are your thoughts about the possible consequences from [activity]?

iii.

Do you consider your participation in [activity] to be something voluntary, or is it
pretty much unavoidable?

iv.

How familiar are you with [activity]? Is it something you take part in frequently?

v.

Do you know a lot about [activity], and any possible benefits or consequences that
may come from it?

vi.

Do you know many people that take part in [activity]?

vii.

Do you feel that you have a degree of control over the outcome of [activity]?
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Appendix G: Sample of Qualitative data used to Identify Themes and Subthemes
Theme
(Subtheme)

Sample Quotes from Data

Admiration of
Activity

P3: Yeah, I would have bragging rights saying, “I actually did this”
and I would be a part of myself would be proud for taking that step…
P15: My mark wasn’t very good in the class, but I did it and I am very
proud. I decided to take that risk because I think it’s cool to say I did
it. I feel very proud of the difficult courses I have taken.
P24: I’ve always wanted to. I’ve always thought it was really cool. I
love flying. And jumping out of a perfectly good airplane sounded like
a good plan.
P11: It would be one of those life time experiences. To be able to say
I’ve done it and to see the world in a different view.
P2: I don’t think anyone would say anything, but I don’t think it would
be looked on well.
P15: I think it’s cool when people do things like that.
P20: I find it admirable to be able to accept the randomness of life and
its experiences.
P28: I think, in the beginning, coming out of high school, I was really
excited to only be studying the things I want to study. And then, I
realized that there is still a lot of stuff that isn’t that interesting to me.
P34: I don’t think it would ever be something I would consider. Even if
I had that money, I don’t think that would be something I would do.
P34: I know some of my friends do the stock market thing. It has never
meant anything to me.
P9: I think I would avoid anything I don’t feel comfortable with. It’s
something that doesn’t interest me anyways.
P2: …it was one thing I had always wanted to do.
P1: Drinking and gambling can give you a rush, like a quick rush.
Maybe it’s the increase of dopamine, I don’t know, but it’s something
that you don’t have to work hard for.
P10: …[because of] my love and need for speed and going fast, like
motorcycles.
P12: The benefit of that is it makes me feel good. It is a sense of
escape for me.
P17: It’s very exhilarating to carve the cores and go through hills and
rivers, and not stopping no matter what you see.
P21: I enjoy the feeling of being on a motorcycle and the adrenaline.
P27: A lot of it being the adrenaline rush. I used to like going on roller
coasters, but then I got bored of them. I want to go to the next level.
P31: I just love the feeling. I’ll relate to roller coasters. I love the
feeling of having my hands out just when the drop is coming. That
weightless factor.

Interest

Adrenaline
rush /
Sensory
Appeal

113

Social Benefit

P2: I think it’s, like, partially the positive component holds a social
aspect.
P17: You get to bond with your friends.
P32: I do it with my grandma. I find it as an interaction and it’s fun
for us.
P4: Bringing us closer in the relationship. I mean, that definitely helps
build bonds and stuff that way.
P4: Definitely, not part taking would be something that would hinder
those relationships just because there’s conversations that you can’t
participate in and bonding the moments that you can’t be a part of.

Proportion of
Benefits
versus
Consequences

P3: So, it is kind of like, considering the risks and the benefits
involved, they’re kind of equal. I guess it depends on how you execute
your plan in order to cheat your way out of this midterm or final.
P10: Is it worth the fight? Is it worth telling them and it is going to end
up in a fight? Is it worth the drama I don’t need or want?
P12: What are the pros and cons of everything? And, sort of weighing
out long-term risks that could happen.
P13: I would take the consequence of them finding out and getting
mad or grounding me. The benefits are worth it.
P16: I feel like the negative outcomes outweigh the positives because
the positive is only to have a good time.
P19: Doesn’t seem worth it. You’re going to go to jail for a chocolate
bar? Come on, do big or go home.

Severity of
Consequences

P1: There were teachers who you heard horror stories about from
previous programs and people. And I just remember thinking “Oh my
God, I don’t want to take it” and I am crying and “oh blah blah
blah”. And flash forward to today, I have the mentality of don’t cry.
Don’t worry because you either get the credit or you don’t!
P2: I think about like cheating on something, I’d say, I would rather
completely fail an exam. I would rather get a 20% on it rather than
getting a zero and getting kicked out of university.
P11: If I sprang my ankle, that’s one thing. But if I hurt my back and
need to sit in a wheelchair, then that’s the rest of my life.
P22: If I tell the truth, I know I am telling the truth. If I am telling a lie
and she finds out, there is a bigger punishment for that. I know that,
so I don’t do that usually.
P34: Trying your hardest and still failing. That’s defeating. I think I
would rather take a course that is not super interesting but I know I
will do well as long as I am trying. Whereas, something you are trying
and trying and trying, but you don’t make it. It’ll make me not love it.

114

Significance
of Benefit

P11: This professor is crazy hard. Everyone says “you’re not going to
get a good mark”, but I know this professor teaches really well. And I
think the subject material will really benefit me in the long run
P20: It would be hard, but the idea of “I am doing this for something
greater” would really help me to push through that.
P22: If it is really important to me, I don’t care about the risks. If it’s
important than I have to do it. I would take the risk.
P22: If I had money right now, I would invest in small businesses. I
would invest. I wouldn’t invest in bonds because there isn’t much
gain.
P26: I would cheat for a scholarship, and willing to push my luck for
it. If it was to cheat just for a good grade, I would do it once and then
not try to do it anymore.

Disappoint
Significant
Others

P1: Like I would never want my parents to be ashamed of me. Or, you
know, my friends would just think “What happened? Like, why would
you do something like that?”
P23: They wouldn’t get mad, mad. I just don’t want to disappoint
them.
P33: It’s difficult because it’s people I love, and they trust me. If I lie
to them, I feel like I am piercing a dagger in their chest because, I am
not only hurting myself, but them.
P4: I come from a family that is very against drugs, so there would
definitely be my parents feeling like they have failed and their
disappointment.
P1: You don’t know what’s going to happen. You never know what’s
going to happen on the road but you’re safe when you put your
seatbelt on.
P12: The first thing is if there’s another way to take it without that
professor...Gain some control to take it in the summer or the winter or
the fall. Maybe the professor will be different.
P12: In my family and where I am at for my age, 21, there’s still a lot
of “you don’t know how to make your choices yet. We still have to
guide your specific path and tell you what works and what doesn’t.”
My main thing is even when I want to control that situation, I know I
can’t.
P14: If I felt like I had control then, I might be more apt to do it.
P15: But I like being in control of my own thing and you’re attached
to someone who has control over what’s going to happen to you—
whether you fall flat—I think I would panic midair and it would not go
well.
P17: There is things you can do before, like having a SAT phone or
being in a big group or educating yourself or knowing what to do if
you encounter a dangerous animal.
P21: If I was going to gamble, I would do it as a poker game because I
feel like I have more control, rather than the machines.

Control of
Situation
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Predictability

Skills or
Abilities

Ease of
Participation

P1: Even though, I focus so much on it and I appreciate it so much
that there’s still a potential that it will not work out…. The only thing
that can tell is time
P12: The immediate fear is where am I landing? Is it the ocean, land,
a person’s house? Where are we going?
P13: Doing drugs is a lot more risky. You never know what you are
getting.
P15: I think it was a very risky move because I tend to live at home
and in my comfy little nest. So, [student exchange] is going out of my
comfort zone which is a risk.
P17: If I am in a safe place, then 6 or 7 shots, I will be fine—I will just
stay there. But if I am in a public place, I wouldn’t do it. I don’t know
what other people will do. I don’t know what will happen.
P19: I think you can sum it up as, “risk is the unknown and people are
afraid of that unknown”. That’s why they are risk averse.
P24: I would definitely invest in real estates before investing in bonds
or the stock market because nobody knows when the stock market
goes up or down.
P1: I am a better driver now, I don’t think about my safety. I don’t
think about “I need to put my seatbelt on”.
P14: I am not good at poker, blackjack, and stuff like that. If I were
good, then maybe
P20: When I make the decision to drive, I know I can operate a
machine at that moment. I know myself pretty well in my toxicity level
and what I can do.
P25: I play video games a lot and they are decently competitive.
Would I put money on some of those, maybe if I had a chance of
winning. It’s more skill oriented than random chances in those. The
more skill I have, the more control I have in the situation.
P28: I have been training up to the meet, for example. It’s something I
feel comfortable with.
P3: If I were to pick up a skate board, at first, I would try to go in
stages. I would never try to go from a kick flip right off the bat
because I’ve hardly done any skating in my life time.
P3: Let’s say if I was trying to steal a chocolate bar instead of a flat
screen tv. Besides the size, I feel like it would be easier for you to go
for the chocolate bar.
P11: I’d be more willing to steal a chocolate bar at a small store with
small security than a chocolate bar from a store with high security.
P18: I had to write a test outside of my class with my phone in my
pocket and the teacher never checked on me. I could’ve cheated.
P19: You going to twist the neck to see his paper? Might as well study.
It’s easier than cheating.
P27: I want to do stuff that doesn’t require me to have a lot of
background information and knowledge.
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Vulnerable or
Unsafe
Conditions

P1: When I was first driving, I was driving a very unsafe vehicle. Like,
it was a car probably from the 80s. And I’m not sure that there were
many safety standards at all, let alone the ones we have today…
P12: What I was most worried about was the coral in the reef because
if you touched it, it could paralyze you…That was what kept me from
fully enjoying the sharks because I was concentrating on the coral.
P15: I applied to France and there have been recent terrorist attacks
so that also scared me.
P31: If I was at a party…like a sketchy party, I would not drink that
much because I wouldn’t want to let my guard down.
P36: …the idea that I am exposing myself and putting myself in a
vulnerable space being intoxicated like that is not appealing.

Ethical or
P2: It’s not about being caught or not, it’s living with that money that
Moral
you stole. It makes me feel sick. I don’t think I am satisfied with who I
considerations am right now. I don’t want to have money unless I made it.
P10: It’s probably tempting if I am hungry. It’s still wrong. I wouldn’t
do it.
P11: It’s wrong and it’s very, very wrong. Not just kinda wrong.
P12: It was that guilt and shame that I would lie to my parents and I
wasn’t brought up like that.
P12: My mom always says, “your work ethics means more than your
grades on your transcript”. And I’ve grown to fully believe that.
P13: I would think “you can’t do that. It is wrong”
P17: Even if it is only the rich 1%, it’s still not mine and I don’t have
the right to take that.

Immediacy of
Effect

P10: Cancer? Then that’s not good. Sometimes I think about it if I am
laying out in the sun too long… Sometimes I do think about it but not
as much as the burn.
P11: I’d go for the $1, $3, or $4 [scratch tickets]. Buy something that
would give me immediate gratification.
P15: It would be the immediate changes to my health that would worry
me. Long term, that could be horrible and detrimental to your health.
But the immediate knowing that I would gain weight…I think that
would be the immediate thoughts of needing to change my diet.
P22: Heart disease and stuff, yeah, they are there, but I don’t think
about them because I like food. My age is such that I don’t care about
heart diseases and stuff.
P27: If I was closer to my retirement, I would be less interested
in the stock market. But, because I am young, and I can wait for that
rebound, I am less concerned about that.
P33: With bonds, it’s a slow process. I’d forget about it
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Knowledge
about activity

P13: I don’t know how to do it.
P15: I personally wouldn’t do it because I don’t know how. I’ve never
played Poker.
P11: [In Kinesiology], we’ve talked a lot of physical stuff, like
injuries. I think my perspective would be different if I majored in
something else
P23: People who are in stock market know which ones go up and
which ones don’t. They have more knowledge. For me, I don’t really
know.
P27: I’ve never played any card games at the Casino because I find
them really intimidating. I don’t want to walk up to a table and not
know what I am doing.
P35: I don’t think we have expertise in robbery to pull something like
that. We have to get it planned.

Gain
experience or
Info

P6: In a way, it could open up an opportunity. Say the government
sees that you can do this, they can hire this guy to prevent other
people from doing what he is doing.
P11: I am willing to take the risk to gain the experience.
P20: If the [tough] course is interesting to me I would still do it just
for the pursuit of education.

Necessity

P13: I think there’s a lot of other options before that point. I don’t
think I would ever let myself do that.
P15: If it wasn’t a necessity, I wouldn’t steal. If I had the money, I
would pay for it.
P17: I would think of other alternatives before I resorted to
[cheating].
P22: I would do it for sure. Survival and risk taking, if it is a question
of survival, survival wins.
P25: I absolutely need to defend myself. If I am being pushed into a
fight that means to do me harm, then by all means I have to fight.
P27: How badly I would need it too. If I really need it for Grad school
and this is my last year and my last class and it’s weighted heavily
and I wasn’t able to study at all.
P6: I feel like if you really need it, you need to do what’s
best for you at the time.
P33: It comes to desperation. We all have that part in our minds for
our survival—needs to get that scholarship, “You NEED it. YOU
BETTER CHEAT BOI.”
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Participation
by Others

P23: The more common it is, the more likely I am going to do it. The
less common, the less likely I am to do it.
P24: I feel like it happens quite a bit. There is always a few kids that
are cheating during every exam.
P26: I am usually in the background and let them try first. If they are
ok, I should be ok.
P28: If I knew other people had [test bank answers], then going in, I
would have too. Other people are going into the test with that
advantage, I want that advantage too.
P31: If it’s more common—because you can see the chance. I am very
probable. If they got out of it without any harm, then, “Awww what
the heck”
P33: I am not going to do it just because everybody else is doing it.
P35: Sometimes it’s easier to fit in than to be by yourself. I’d be more
tempted because everyone else is doing it.

Past
experience

P11: No matter what, safety first because I have so many past
experiences. I have seen people getting hit and seeing the medical side
of things by seeing people come out and having to go through rehab
because they weren’t wearing a seatbelt. Seeing people losing their
extremities, like a leg, in a car. And it was because they weren’t
wearing a seatbelt.
P1: I lost a friend to an accident where they were not wearing their
seatbelt. And for a while, I, you know, I was consciously aware of
“put your seatbelt on, put your seatbelt on”
P12: [I hide my sexuality because] I came out to my parents during
my first year of university in my letter, and it didn’t go as well as I
hoped. They swept it under the rug and “it’s a phase”. They sent me
to therapy and all that stuff.

Probability

P11: If I knew there was a higher chance of being caught, I’d be
against it…a lower chance, then I would be more for it.
P17: The odds of it paying out is too minuscule for me to want to
spend money.
P28: I’d probably buy a scratch ticket before a lottery ticket. I think a
lottery ticket is more unlikely for multimillions. If I were to play a
scratch ticket for a thousand bucks, it’s almost like more of a chance.
P31: If you are playing roulette and you put down your money on red,
then there is 40% you will win. But then the 60% chance of you losing
money is more. It’s a flip of a coin at that point. It’s not worth it.
P7: Immediately, I’m thinking can I get away with it… “How possible
is it?” you’re weighing whether it’s feasible…
P9: The probability is really low so I don’t play the lottery.
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Relative to
Current
Position

P1: Like only if I had 5 days to live, sure, why not, right?
P2: I wouldn’t want to ruin, like, everything that I’ve worked for so far
in my life, knowing that, like, all of those years and years of school or
whatever just to have a future that’s a dead end.
P9: I am already in a good environment; I would think about the
consequence. What if I take this [new] job and it won’t last long? I am
not going to have a job.
P10: Too much to lose…not worth it.
P14: Maybe if I didn’t have a place to live, like literally nothing to
lose…I could see getting caught up in that kind of thing…maybe
getting away with it.
P17: If you get caught [cheating], you could get kicked out of
university. So, all these years that you’ve done will mean nothing.
P27: I do not think I would take that risk. I don’t think I would want to
give up my future and my goals. It’s a lot. Short term risks to that is
huge. I am at a good spot in life.
P29: Too young to die. I have too much to lose.

Apathy

P1: But I also think, “Well, I could get out of my car and a car could
hit me and I could die.”
P10: I have heard of people getting injured, but that’s with everything.
Maybe I’d try.
P12: There’s risk with everything in life… walking out the door.
P19: Thinking from health aspect, I really don’t care. I am French so
health means nothing to me. Everybody smokes there.
P24: It’s something that I worry about less because I live in Windsor
and it has the highest cancer rates. If I figure I will get it anyways.

Religion

P11: I am not worried about letting down my friends nor my parents
being ashamed of their kid making a stupid decision. But I am
ashamed of letting down God.
P17: Stealing from a bank and all of the people, it violates the 10
commandments.
P23: I don’t drink at all. That has nothing to do with drinking. It’s
because I can’t drink because of my religion. I don’t drink at all. Not
one. Not ten. It won’t make a difference at all.
P3: If you’re religious, at all too, I mean, stealing is considered to be
a sin so it would just be bad…
P35: It’s more a fear of disappointing God. I know I will be forgiven.
It’s more the sin. God is watching me and is shaking his head right
now.
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Fear / phobia

P13: I’d be too scared and anxious [to cheat].
P22: If someone pushes me [out of the plane], it would be better. I
don’t think that I would be able to go on my own. I won’t do that, but I
want to.
P4: People are like, “Oh, it’s fine. I’m a good driver.” And I’m like,
“You don’t understand. I can’t handle this. I will start crying if I can’t
get this seat belt on my body right now!”
P9: I am very terrified of heights. I think for me that even if someone
said “I’ll give you a billion dollars” I still wouldn’t
Risk to Others P33: I am bi-sexual, and my family is super religious. If I were to tell
them I have a slight thing for guys, they would be shocked and
disappointed. It comes down to I rather not have them feel that pain.
I’d rather hold that in myself and let them live in the world of, “My
son is a straight person who we can trust.”
P33: I think this ties into consequences, but mostly it’s how it affects
others besides me.
P4: I have some family members that do have academic reputations,
not at this university, but at different universities. I would probably be
concerned with how that affects them if I was plagiarizing. Would that
ruin their reputations in some way?
P14: If you are in a car accident and you are not strapped in, you
could injure other people in the car because you become projectile.
P28: If I can reason with myself that this is not going to affect their
life that much, I am ok.
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Appendix H: Risk perception Scale Statements used in Study 2 with primary,
representative question items bolded

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

It is an admirable activity.
Most people see it as an admirable activity.
I think it is an activity my friends would admire.
It requires a personal characteristic (e.g., bravery, kindness) that I find admirable.
I would feel embarrassed if people I know found out that I had done it
I find it interesting.
It is not the type of activity that I find interesting.
I just don’t see the point in doing it
It just doesn’t appeal to me.
I can think of much better ways to use my time or resources.
It is just not worth my effort
I would enjoy the sensation that I could get from it
I am driven to do it because of the feeling it could give me.
It would give me a pleasurable feeling.
It would allow me to cut loose and enjoy myself.
I would get a feeling of satisfaction from it
It would provide an adrenaline rush.
There would be a sense of exhilaration from it
It is an activity that could give me a thrill.
It would be really exciting / pleasurable.
It is one of those experiences that you can’t wait to tell your friends about.
It would be great to be able to tell my friends about it
Taking part in it gives you a good story to share with friends.
I would enjoy the feeling of being able to say that I have done that.
I feel there is a benefit to being able to say that I have done this.
I feel that I can experience personal growth from it
Taking part in this would make me a better person.
It would allow me to express a different aspect of myself.
Doing it would make it easier to have similar experiences in the future.
Taking part in it can create other opportunities for me.
I would find it entertaining.
It would be an escape for me.
It could be relaxing
It would help in coping with everyday life.
It would be fun to do
It would be a good way to pass some time
Being able to do it would make me feel powerful.
I would feel powerful when I do it
I would feel a sense of accomplishment for doing this.
Facing it head on is an accomplishment in itself.
I see it as a challenge that I want to overcome.
Doing it would be quality time spent with people I care about.
This is an activity I can share with people I enjoy spending time with.
It can bring me closer to the people I care about.
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45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

There are more possible benefits than consequences
There are more possible consequences than benefits
The possible consequence is extremely severe
If this goes bad, then it would go really bad (devastating)
Even if it did not go well for me, the consequence would not be too bad
If this goes bad, the consequences would affect the rest of my life
The consequences could turn out bad, but it isn’t the worst thing I could do
If this goes well, the benefit would be life changing
The possible benefit(s) would be extremely valuable
This could lead to great benefit
The possible benefit is just not meaningful to me
Even though there may be a cost to me, this would benefit others
This is worth any possible consequences, because it would benefit others
I worry that if I did it once, I might want to keep doing it
This isn’t something that people should do often
The possible consequences would be really annoying
People I care about might be ashamed of me if I did this
If I did this, I could disappoint people close to me
I feel like I would be letting people down if I did this
Other people may be angry at me for doing this
I may make others upset with me if I do this
If this goes bad, I could lose something I really need
At least if this goes bad, I wouldn’t lose anything meaningful
This activity is just not safe
This would put my personal safety at risk
I could get in trouble with the law for doing this
I might get in trouble from a person in authority
I would feel defeated if this did not work out for me
I would feel disappointed in myself if I was not successful at this
I have some personal control in how this turns out
There are things I can do to make sure this turns out in my favour
Other people are in control of the outcome
Taking part in this activity would make me feel vulnerable
The outcome is just a result of random chance that I can’t control
I can control the severity of any possible negative outcomes
The consequence wouldn’t be too bad as long as I take precautions
There is a period of time where I could back out without consequences
Even if things don’t work out to my benefit, I know I can handle the consequences
Even with preparation, there are a lot of things that could go wrong
No matter how much I try to control the outcome, there are just some things in this situation
that are beyond my control
It requires too much effort to try and control the outcome
There are ways to control the outcome severity, but those precautions just are not right for me
I don’t have the resources that would be necessary for this to work in my favour
The possible outcomes are unpredictable
There are so many things that might happen that it is impossible to foresee what will happen
I have skills that would help this work out positively
I do not have any personal ability with this activity
I feel comfortable with it, because I have skills in this activity
It takes a lot of preparation to do this
There are no barriers to taking part in this
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95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

It does not require much effort to do this
I see this as a new challenge to overcome
You have to try it to get experience
I can trust the people and environment involved
I feel comfortable with the situation
It goes against my ethics
Participating in it is ethically wrong
This would make me feel good about my personal character
I would feel guilty for doing this
I would have a hard time living with my conscience after doing this
It goes against my morals
I would have a hard time forgiving myself for doing this
There is nothing wrong with doing this
This is just something I would do without thinking about it
It is something I see as a normal thing to do
Any possible consequences wouldn’t happen until far in the future
I might suffer consequences in the future
This would benefit me right away
I would not see any benefit until some time in the future
I do not know much about it
I am confident that I have sufficient knowledge about this activity
I have some prior knowledge in this area
I trust that I have enough information to make an informed decision
The only way to learn about it is from doing it
This would provide me with an opportunity to gain life experience
I could gain some knowledge and experience from it
I am optimistic that it would end in my favour
I am a very lucky person, so everything would be fine
I am a very unlucky person
Things like this do not usually work out well for me
I am not concerned about how it would turn out
I just don’t really care how it turns out
Taking part in this means a lot to me
This is something very important to me
This is an activity that I value
I am not in a position where I feel that it is necessary to do this
This is the only viable option for me
There could be worse consequences if I didn’t do it.
There are better ways for me to achieve a similar benefit
I would do whatever was necessary to avoid this activity
Most of my peers do this
This is a very common activity that a lot of people do
This has worked out favourable for me in the past
This has turned out well for someone close to me
I know from experience (personal/people close to me) that this could turn out bad for me
The odds are not in my favour
The probability of this working out well for me is very high
There is a very high chance that this would benefit me
It is likely that this will not turn out well
I am at a point in my life where this just feels right
I am not in a situation where this would be a good decision right now
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146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

I have nothing to lose
I feel that all I can do is to improve on my current position
Even if it didn’t work well, I would not be much worse off
I have too much to lose
I am content with my current situation, and this could negatively affect it
My life is great, so why would I bother doing this?
Risk is everywhere is life, so why not?
I could get hit by a bus tomorrow, so why not try this?
Bad stuff happens in life, whether I do this or not
I have strong religious beliefs that prevent me from taking part
This does not align with my spiritual beliefs
Doing this could damage my reputation
This could set a bad example for people who look up to me
People might look down on me for doing this
Respectable people wouldn’t do this
I would be embarrassed if people knew I did this
I just don’t think anything bad would happen
People that I care about would be with me
I would be doing this by myself
Just the thought of this terrifies me
I feel extreme fear at the thought of doing this
Any possible harm would only happen to people who deserve it
The people being affected are in a position that it wouldn’t really hurt them anyway
Bad things could happen to other people
This could result in harming innocent people
No one else would be affected except me
This could have negative effects for me, not just other people
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Appendix I: Comparison of risk perception facets with previous research
Fischhoff et al.
(1978)

Admiration

Benthin et al.
(1993a)

Hampson et al.
(2001a)

Admiration

Peer admiration

Peer influence

Peer pressure

Interested
Sensory / Adrenaline

Social Benefit
Benefit vs Consequences

Severity of Consequences

Benefits vs. risks
Severity of
consequences

Seriousness of
effects

Significance of Benefit

Benefits

Disappoint Others
Control of Situation

Parental approval
Control over risk

Personal control

controllability

Need for
regulation

Unpredictability
Skills or Abilities
Ease of Participation
Vulnerable / Unsafe Conditions

Ease of doing
Chronic - catastrophic

Personal risk

Personal risk

Ethical or Moral Considerations
Immediacy of Effect
Knowledge about Activity

Immediacy of effect
Knowledge
1.Personal 2.Scientific

Informational
value

Gain Experience or Information
Necessity

Voluntariness

Avoidability

Avoidability

Perceived
participation

Perceived
participation

Newness

Old or new risk

Newness

Common - Dread

Fear

Participation by Others
Past Experience

Knowledge

Probability
Relative to Current Position
Apathy
Religion
Fear or Phobia
Risk to Others

Risk to peers
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Risk to others

Appendix J: Para-Risk Perception Items used in Study 2
People often see some risk in situations that contain uncertainty about what the outcome or
consequences will be and for which there is the possibility of ‘bad’ consequences. However,
riskiness is a very personal and intuitive notion that can change depending on personal
circumstances, and we are interested in your gut level assessment of how risky each situation is
for you personally.
1. Please indicate your overall assessment of the riskiness of each of the following activities
Rated on a 7-point scale from “not at all risky” to “extremely risky”
Activities:
• Investing in the stock market
• Slightly cheating on taxes (e.g., exaggerating expenses)

2. Please indicate the extent to which you, personally, consider the following activities as being
worth the risk
Rated on a 7-point scale from “definitely not worth it” to “definitely worth it”
Activities:
• Investing in the stock market
• Slightly cheating on taxes (e.g., exaggerating expenses)

3. Please indicate how likely you would be to receive negative effects if you took part in the
following activities
Rated on a 7-point scale from “extremely unlikely” to “extremely likely”
Activities:
• Investing in the stock market
• Slightly cheating on taxes (e.g., exaggerating expenses)

4. Please indicate how likely you would be to receive benefits if you took part in the following
activities.
Rated on a 7-point scale from “extremely unlikely” to “extremely likely”
Activities:
• Investing in the stock market
• Slightly cheating on taxes (e.g., exaggerating expenses)

5. If given the opportunity, how likely is it that you would consider taking part in the following
activities within the next 6 months?
Rated on a 7-point scale from “extremely unlikely” to “extremely likely”
Activities:
• Investing in the stock market
• Slightly cheating on taxes (e.g., exaggerating expenses)
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Appendix K: Study 3 Tentative Holistic Appraisal of Risk Perception (HARP) Scale
Instructions:
Please indicate the extent that you agree with the following items when you think about
the situation:
________________ (first administration is “Skydiving”; second administration is “Buying
a $50 lottery ticket from a charity organization”)

Rating Scale: 7-point Likert-type
1 = strongly disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = somewhat disagree; 4 = neither agree nor disagree; 5 =
somewhat agree; 6 = agree; 7 = strongly agree

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

I think it is an activity my friends would admire.
This is an activity that I value
It is one of those experiences that you can’t wait to tell your friends about.
It just doesn’t appeal to me.
I would enjoy the feeling of being able to say that I have done that.
It would be really exciting/pleasurable
I would find it entertaining.
I would get a feeling of satisfaction from it
This is an activity I can share with people I enjoy spending time with.
There are more possible benefits than consequences
The possible consequence is extremely severe
I would feel defeated if this did not work out for me
Even if it did not go well for me, the consequence would not be too bad
The possible benefit(s) would be extremely valuable
The possible benefit is just not meaningful to me
People I care about might be ashamed of me if I did this
I feel like I would be letting people down if I did this
Taking part in this activity would make me feel vulnerable
I have some personal control in how this turns out
The possible outcomes are unpredictable
I have skills that would help this work out positively
Being able to do it would make me feel powerful.
I would feel a sense of accomplishment for doing this.
It takes a lot of preparation to do this
This activity is just not safe
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26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Participating in it is ethically wrong
I would have a hard time living with my conscience after doing this
It goes against my morals
I would be embarrassed if people knew I did this
Any possible consequences wouldn’t happen until far in the future
This would benefit me right away
I am confident that I have sufficient knowledge about this activity
I see it as a challenge that I want to overcome.
Taking part in it can create other opportunities for me.
I could gain some knowledge and experience from it
There could be worse consequences if I didn’t do it.
There are better ways for me to achieve a similar benefit
This is a very common activity that a lot of people do
I know from experience (personal/people close to me) that this could turn out bad for me
The odds are not in my favour
There is a very high chance that this would benefit me
Even if it didn’t work well, I would not be much worse off
I am content with my current situation, and this could negatively affect it
Risk is everywhere is life, so why not?
This does not align with my spiritual beliefs
Just the thought of this terrifies me
This could result in harming innocent people
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Appendix L: Cognitive Appraisal of Risky Events (CARE) Scale (Fromme, Katz &
Rivet, 1997)
Expected Risk Subscale Instructions:
Please rate the likelihood that a negative consequence would occur from each of the following
activities. A negative consequence is defined as one in which you might become sick, injured,
embarrassed,
lose money, suffer legal consequences, fail a class, or feel bad about yourself.
Expected Benefit Subscale Instructions:
Please rate the likelihood that a positive benefit would occur from each of the following
activities. A positive benefit is defined as one in which you would experience pleasure, win
money, feel good about yourself, etc.
Expected Involvement Subscale Instructions:
Please rate the likelihood that, given the opportunity, you would engage in this activity in the
next 6 months.
Rating Scale:
1 = Not at all likely; 2 = Unlikely; 3 = Somewhat unlikely; 4 = Neutral; 5 = Somewhat Likely;
6 = Likely; 7 = Extremely Likely

Items:

Risky Sexual Activities
4. Leaving a social event with someone I have just met
12. Sex without protection against pregnancy
16. Sex without protection against sexually transmitted diseases
27. Involvement in sexual activities without my consent
23. Sex with multiple partners
29. Sex with someone I have just met or don't know well

Illicit drug use
1. Trying/using drugs other than alcohol or marijuana
22. Smoking marijuana
25. Mixing drugs and alcohol
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Aggressive and illegal behaviours
3. Grabbing, pushing, or shoving someone
5. Driving after drinking alcohol
6. Making a scene in public
10. Disturbing the peace
11. Damaging/destroying public property
14. Hitting someone with a weapon or object
19. Slapping someone
21. Punching or hitting someone with fist
16. Getting into a fight or argument
Heavy Drinking
9. Drinking alcohol too quickly
7. Drinking more than 5 alcoholic beverages
28. Playing drinking games
High Risk Sports
15. Rock or mountain climbing
17. Playing non-contact team sports
24. Snow or water skiing
30. Playing individual sports
Academic / Work Behaviours
2. Missing class or work
8. Not studying for exam or quiz
13. Leaving tasks or assignments for the last minute
18. Failing to do assignments
20. Not studying or working hard enough
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Appendix M: Gambling Behaviour Scale (Craig, 2014)

Participant Instructions:
If given the opportunity, how likely is it that you would engage in this activity?

Rating Scale:
1 = No Chance

2 = Very unlikely

3 = Unlikely

4 = Not sure

5 = Likely

Items:

1. Casino slot machines
2. Casino card games (poker, black jack, etc.)
3. Other casino games
4. Internet slot machines
5. Internet card games (poker, black jack, etc.)
6. Other internet gambling
7. Lottery tickets (6/49, Super 7, etc.)
8. Instant-win or scratch tickets (pull-tab, Nevada strips, etc.)
9. Raffle tickets
10. Cards with friends for money (poker, black jack, etc.)
11. Board or dice (for money)
12. Sport Select (Pro Line, Over/Under, Point Spread)
13. Sports pools or games (football, hockey, basketball, etc.)
14. Bingo
15. Horse race (live at track and/or off-track)
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6 = Very Likely

7 = Definitely

Appendix N: Brief Sensation Seeking Scale (BSSS)
(Hoyle, Stephenson, Palmgreen, Lorch, & Donohew, 2002)

Participant Instructions:
Please indicate the extent that you agree with the following items.

Rating Scale:
1 = strongly disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = neither disagree nor agree; 4 = agree; 5 = strongly
agree

Experience seeking Subscale Items:
1. I would like to explore strange places.
2. I would like to take off on a trip with no pre-planned routes or timetables.

Boredom susceptibility Subscale Items:
3. I get restless when I spend too much time at home.
4. I prefer friends who are excitingly unpredictable.
Thrill and adventure seeking Subscale Items:
5. I like to do frightening things.
6. I would like to try bungee jumping.
Disinhibition Subscale Items:
7. I like wild parties.
8. I would love to have new and exciting experiences, even if they are illegal.
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Appendix 0: Holistic Appraisal of Risk Perception (HARP) Scale
Participant Instructions:
Please indicate the extent that you agree with the following items when you think about
the situation: ________________

Rating Scale: 8-point Likert-type
0 = non-applicable (n/a); 1 = strongly disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = somewhat disagree; 4 = neither
agree nor disagree; 5 = somewhat agree; 6 = agree; 7 = strongly agree
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

I think it is an activity my friends would admire (R)
This is an activity that I value (R)
It is one of those experiences that you can’t wait to tell your friends about (R)
It just doesn’t appeal to me.
I would enjoy the feeling of being able to say that I have done that. (R)
It would be really exciting/pleasurable (R)
I would find it entertaining. (R)
I would get a feeling of satisfaction from it (R)
This is an activity I can share with people I enjoy spending time with. (R)
There are more possible benefits than consequences (R)
The possible consequence is extremely severe
I would feel defeated if this did not work out for me
Even if it did not go well for me, the consequence would not be too bad (R)
The possible benefit(s) would be extremely valuable (R)
The possible benefit is just not meaningful to me
People I care about might be ashamed of me if I did this
I feel like I would be letting people down if I did this
Taking part in this activity would make me feel vulnerable
I have some personal control in how this turns out (R)
The possible outcomes are unpredictable
I have skills that would help this work out positively (R)
Being able to do it would make me feel powerful. (R)
I would feel a sense of accomplishment for doing this (R)
It takes a lot of preparation to do this
This activity is just not safe
Participating in it is ethically wrong
I would have a hard time living with my conscience after doing this
It goes against my morals
I would be embarrassed if people knew I did this
Any possible consequences wouldn’t happen until far in the future (R)
This would benefit me right away (R)
I am confident that I have sufficient knowledge about this activity (R)
I see it as a challenge that I want to overcome. (R)
Taking part in it can create other opportunities for me. (R)
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35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

I could gain some knowledge and experience from it (R)
There could be worse consequences if I didn’t do it. (R)
There are better ways for me to achieve a similar benefit
This is a very common activity that a lot of people do (R)
I know from experience (personal/people close to me) that this could turn out bad for me
The odds are not in my favour
There is a very high chance that this would benefit me (R)
Even if it didn’t work well, I would not be much worse off R)
I am content with my current situation, and this could negatively affect it
Risk is everywhere is life, so why not? (R)
This does not align with my spiritual beliefs
Just the thought of this terrifies me
This could result in harming innocent people

Scoring Instructions:
Reverse score (R) items (perceives as a bad risk). Sum all items for total scale score. While this
scale is not intended to examine individual facets, identification of facets is as follows:
Admiration (sum items 1, 2, 3)
Interest (sum items 4, 5)
Sensory/Adrenaline (sum items 6, 7, 8)
Social Benefit (item 9)
Benefits vs Consequences (item 10)
Severity of Consequences (sum items 11, 12, 13)
Significance of Benefit (sum items14, 15)
Disappoint others (sum items 16, 17)
Control (sum items 18, 19)
Predictability (item 20)
Skills or Abilities (sum items 21, 22, 23)
Ease of participation (item 24)
Unsafe (item 25)
Ethical Considerations (sum items 26, 27, 28, 29)
Immediacy of Effect (sum items 30, 31)
Knowledge about activity (item 32)
Gain experience/opportunity (sum items 33, 34, 35)
Necessity (sum items 36, 37)
Commonality (item 38)
Past experience (item 39)
Probability (sum items 40, 41)
Relative to current position (sum items 42, 43)
Apathy (item 44)
Religion (item 45)
Fear/Phobia (item 46)
Risk to others (item 47)
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